


# **ELECTION FRAUD: PREVALENCE AND IMPACT IN BULGARIA**



**Parliamentary  
Election,  
October 2022**

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**Y**ou have before you the latest study of the Anti-Corruption Fund (ACF), dedicated to the controlled and bought vote in Bulgaria. More than 30 years after the beginning of the political changes, the problem of electoral manipulation remains painful. This fact points to a tacit consensus, among at least a portion of the political 'elite,' for perpetuating flawed electoral practices.

The ACF, in a series of studies, analyzed this problem. Based on three models, they highlighted 1,738 polling stations where there is a persistently higher risk of controlled and bought votes.

According to the ACF, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), GERB, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) have for years been the top three political formations to receive the most votes at risk. Based on empirical data analysis, these parties are seriously suspected of systematically obtaining a sizable proportion of their votes through electoral manipulation.

In the early parliamentary elections on 2 October 2022, the MRF remains the party with the most votes 'at risk' – 88,400 votes or nearly 42% of the votes at risk in total for the country as a whole. The share of votes at risk in the overall result for MRF in October was 30.5%, for GERB-UDF – nearly 8%, and for BSP – 7.4%.

Vote trading is a lucrative business controlled by organized crime and patronized by interested political entities. In Bulgaria, the neediest, poorly educated voters are the most frequent targets of electoral manipulation. It is no secret that the votes of minority ethnic communities, above all the Roma, are particularly at risk.

There are reasons to argue that many of the ethnic political entrepreneurs in Bulgaria have a vested interest in the poor integration of the Roma, as this allows their votes to continue to be abused.

The ACF study analyzing the vote in the previous election reported some decline in votes at risk. Possible (but not the only) explanations for this include the introduction earlier in the year, in all polling stations of over 300 voters, of machine voting only, and police action against controlled and bought voting.

More data are needed, of course, to verify these hypotheses. The fact is, however, that machine voting has put barriers to several 'traditional' and tested techniques applied to paper ballots, such as the 'Indian thread,' for example. In some cases, the new technology has 'forced' those manipulating election results to use more visible and crude methods. The ACF investigations in Sr. Bukovlak<sup>1</sup>, for example, have demonstrated attempts to directly instruct voters in front of the machine itself how to exercise their vote, threats, including physical reprisals, to members of electoral commissions, etc.

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1 <https://acf.bg/en/pravilata-na-bukovlak/>

It is also curious that in the 47th and the current 48th National Assembly, GERB and BSP insist on the “return” of paper ballots. Mustafa Karadayi, the leader of the MRF, said in December 2021 that machine voting had turned away half a million voters. We cannot rule out that a

coalition will emerge in the 48th National Assembly to force the ‘return of paper’ before the new early elections in early 2023.

A limitation of the ACF’s Votes at Risk research is that it only analyses data for polling stations within the country – not abroad, where millions of our fellow citizens live. Therefore, we do not have a direct insight into the processes and dynamics of votes at risk in countries, for example, such as Turkey and Germany, where there are many Bulgarians.

The point of studies like the ACF’s is to alert society to draw its attention to flawed electoral practices. Only an awakened electorate, clearly aware of its rights and obligations in the democratic political process, can rein in ethnic entrepreneurs and vote-sellers.

Dr. Petar Cholakov

# Key findings of the analysis

- In the 1738 polling stations at risk, with recurring risk behavior a slight increase in the turnout can be observed. It can be noted, that for the period July 2021 – October 2022 the number of votes, casted in the sections at risk in the country is relatively stable.
- The highest share of votes at risk from all the votes in the country, measured by sections with reoccurring risk behavior, are registered in the electoral districts of Kardzhali, Burgas and Blagoevgrad.
- Highest increase of the number of voted in such sections can be registered in the electoral districts of Plovdiv (city), Vidin, and Kyustendil.
- In the electoral districts of Yambol and Pleven a decrease is observed.
- Highest share of controlled voting is registered in the municipalities of Kardzhai, Haskovo and Kirkovo.
- An increase in the results of The Rights and freedom movement in the sections at risk. They maintain their leader position for votes, casted at polling stations at risk.
- Compared to the sections at risk, showing deviations on these elections, the highest share of votes at risk are registered in Pazardzhik, Blagoevgrad and Stara Zagora.
- Highest votes in risk sections, compared to all the sections at risk in the electoral district, can be observed in Targovisthe, Lovech and Montana.
- Saturation of all the sections with deviations can be observed in Gurkovo, Yakimovo, Hayredin, Teteven, Brusartci, Bratya Daskalovi, Hitrino, Medkovetc, and Zlataritsa.
- In 144 polling stations a serious saturation of preferential voting can be observed (over 85% of the votes for one party are casted for one candidate), which is a strong indicator for controlled or purchased vote.
- On these elections no serious deviation in the number of registered citizens by administrative units, prior to the elections can be observed.

Based on the analysis of the results from the parliamentary elections in 2013 – 2021, the Anti-Corruption Fund has developed a methodology for identifying the polling stations at a higher risk of controlled and purchased vote. They were determined using three models:

- **Multicomponent unusual behavior model.** It identifies the stations in which there is: (1) an atypically high turnout in a station compared to the registered turnout in the municipality and<sup>2</sup> (2) an atypically high result of the leading political party in the section compared to the registered result of the party in the municipality, as well as (3) the atypically high number of invalid voting papers in the station. After the introduction of mandatory machine voting by amendments to the Electoral Code of 22 February 2022, the identifier “atypically high number of invalid voting papers and votes” was removed from the model because a machine vote does not presuppose the presence of invalid votes.
- **Model identifying deviations in the turnout in a station in two election years in a row** (after reporting the average change in the turnout at a municipal level). This model is based on the hypothesis that in the absence of a controlled and purchased vote in a station at risk in a given election year, the turnout in it suddenly goes down.
- **Model identifying a sharp change in the political preferences of voters in a section in two election years in a row** – a sharp rise or drop in the votes for a political party in the station (after reporting the overall changes in the political preferences of voters at a municipal level).

Based on the analyses from all parliamentary elections in 2013 – July 2021, 1738 stations were identified in which deviations were observed in the election results at least twice.

**The first part** of the present analysis studies the results from the parliamentary elections (PE) in October 2022 in these 1738 stations. The election results from the PE in October 2022 in these stations at risk are compared to those from the PE in November 2021.

**The second part** presents the results from applying the methodology for identifying the risk of a purchased and controlled vote for the results from the parliamentary elections conducted in October 2022. It provides information about the stations where deviations were observed at the most recent parliamentary elections.

**The third part** of the analysis tracks down deviations in the stations based on preferential voting, as well as atypically high concentration of preferences at the level of candidates for members of parliament.

**The fourth part** measures sharp changes in the number of the voters registered at their present address. An attempt is thus made to identify possible instances of the so-called “election tourism.”

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2. Since July 2022, the multicomponent unusual behavior model has been changed, as there is a conjunction between (1) and (2), i.e., “and” unlike the previous years, when there is disjunction “or.” With the introduction of machines and the elimination of a part of the variables in the model, a decision was made that this approach was more reliable.

# Part 1

## How did the stations previously identified as in high risk of a controlled and purchased vote voted in October 2022?

At the parliamentary elections in October, 12 177 stations were opened, or 371 stations less.


521 mobile stations and 188 stations in hospitals, prisons, and detention facilities were excluded from the risk analysis<sup>3</sup>. 775 small stations with less than 60 registered voters were not included in the risk analysis either. In 253 stations, the number of registered voters differed in the two elections by more than 30%, and they were excluded from the risk analysis. 188 stations in prisons, detention facilities, and hospital institutions are excluded from the analysis.

### Number of people who cast their vote and number of votes for the winner in the stations

As noted in the previous analyses on the topic, it is hard to assume what part of the votes cast in the stations at risk resulted from any incentive or control.

Therefore, the calculations of the amount of the purchased and controlled vote are made for the total number of people who cast their vote in stations at risk and for the votes for the party that won in the stations at risk.

**Figure 1. Votes, casted at risk stations on PE March 2017, PE April 2021, PE July 2021, PE November, and PE October 2022<sup>4</sup>**



3. In previous analyses, the mobile stations are used for determining the results at a municipality level. A decision was made this year not to apply the methodology for identification of stations at risk of a purchased and controlled vote to mobile polling stations, as well as in hospitals, prisons, and detention facilities, because the polling lists are dynamic, which does not allow making a comparison between the results in different elections.

4. The calculations are made based on 1738 stations in the country, which showed a deviation in at least 2 elections in 2013-2021.

At the October 2022 PE, 211 897 citizens cast their vote in the 1738 stations identified as at risk in terms of a purchased and controlled vote at preceding parliamentary elections, . This makes 8.74% of the votes cast in the country. To compare, in November last year, 199 762 votes at risk were cast or 8.18% of all votes. This is a 6.07% growth in the context of a slightly decreased turnout nationally (less than 1%). However, as figure 1 shows, these values are lower than those for July 2021 (222 713). **A note can be made that for the period July 2021 – October 2022, the number of votes cast at stations at risk in the country remains relatively stable.**

The overall turnout in the country in October 2022 was 36.89%, and in the stations at risk, the turnout was 28.06%. This confirms the hypothesis that when there is no incentive or control, the interest in elections in these stations is lower (See the example in graphs 1a,1b,1c, and 1d). As we have noted in previous analyses other possible reasons for the lower turnout could be the actions of the Ministry of Interior to counter crime related to the elective rights of the citizens. In the weeks before the elections, the Ministry of Interior carried out several actions in Sofia, Burgas, Sliven, Varna, etc.<sup>5</sup> An alternative explanation could be introducing mass machine voting in Bulgaria, and making impossible certain methods of controlled vote like the so-called “Indian file”<sup>6</sup>, which requires voting papers (paper ballots). In addition, the controlled vote occurs more frequently among socially and economically vulnerable groups of voters, who also have a lower level of education, which poses difficulties in their voting.

### **An example of the behavior of risk stations in the presence and absence of a controlled and purchased vote**

Tables 1a-1d present the data for the turnout and votes cast for the parties represented in the Parliament after the respective elections in 8 stations at risk in the city of Sofia, 94th Secondary School “Hristo Botev,” 22, 511th str<sup>7</sup>. As evident from Figures 1 and 2, at the April 2021 elections, when there was a higher absolute number of votes in the stations at risk (318 081), as well as a higher turnout – around 10%, compared to 8.7% for the PE in 2022 and under the conditions of considerably higher turnout, the first two parties, achieve high results. However, in the next elections, their results decrease significantly, and the turnout in these stations drops. At the same time, the result of the other parties in the station is relatively static in time and comparable to their results at a municipal level, which is probably the authentic vote in these stations.

Based on figure 2, we can conclude that in crucial political moments, the votes in stations at risk increase. For instance, in April 2021, when there was intense competition which party would emerge as the winner in the elections, and the political situation ensured a higher possibility of setting up a government around the political party GERB-UDF, 98 786 votes at risk were cast for them. That was an increase of more than 21% compared to 2017 – an asymmetric increase compared to the loss of votes all over the country. At the PE in April 2021, GERB-UDF took the lead with the highest share of votes in stations at risk among all parties.

And vice-versa, when in July and November 2021, it was not possible to set up a government around GERB-UDF, their votes in these stations went down. An ad-

5. <https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/kampania-izbori-partii-glasuvane/31989195.html>

6. This mechanism operates by giving the respective voter a pre-filled-out voting paper in front of the ballot station.. After dropping it in the voting box, the empty voting paper received by the voter in the ballot station for voting would be taken out. This process is repeated until all voters whose vote is controlled in the respective section vote.

7. A part of the 1738 stations that showed a deviation under the methodology at least 2 times in 2013 – 2021.

ditional factor contributing to that is also the decreased motivation of the candidates for members of parliament from all parties to resort to this mechanism due to the possibly short horizon of the parliament and the lower chance of full return on investment. At the last elections, when there were again chances for a government nominated by GERB-UDF, the coalition reported a 7% growth in the country and an asymmetrically high growth in the stations at risk of more than 19%. As regards the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a similar process is observed, as given the almost 15 % growth of the votes in the country, the report 19% growth in stations at risk – 4 points more serious mobilization.

**Table 1a.**

PE April, 2021	Number of voters	Number of people who cast their vote	Turnout	GERB-UDF	Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF	DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA– UNION (YES Bulgaria, Democrats for Free Bulgaria, Green Movement)	THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE	BSP for BULGARIA	RENAISSANCE
244607070	538	431	80.11%	198	92	11	29	23	2
244607071	845	738	87.34%	368	267	39	11	19	0
244607072	514	346	67.32%	281	13	18	17	2	0
244607073	878	839	95.56%	443	315	18	25	4	0
244607074	779	423	54.30%	162	50	46	24	17	4
244607075	789	547	69.33%	300	70	100	20	45	1
244607076	643	559	86.94%	160	103	398	11	5	0
244607077	925	730	78.92%	144	100	379	40	24	4

**Table 1b.**

PE July, 2021	Number of voters	Number of people who cast their vote	Additionally written under the page	Turnout	GERB-UDF	Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF	DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA– UNION (YES Bulgaria, Democrats for Free Bulgaria, Green Movement)	THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE	BSP for BULGARIA
244607070	536	79	5	14.60%	17	1	9	38	5
244607071	835	87	5	11.00%	21	2	7	45	6
244607072	517	90	5	18.00%	9	12	11	44	5
244607073	880	119	4	14.00%	8	1	13	61	9
244607074	783	100	5	13.00%	15	0	17	41	8
244607075	790	164	5	21.00%	30	8	26	65	15
244607076	640	117	8	20.00%	25	4	8	51	15
244607077	914	128	9	15.00%	19	2	9	71	10


Table 1c.

PE November, 2021	Number of voters	Number of people who cast their vote	Additionally written under the page	Turnout	GERB-UDF	Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF	DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA– UNION (YES Bulgaria, Democrats for Free Bulgaria, Green Movement)	THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE	We Continue the Change	BSP for BULGARIA
244607070	529	62	9	11.52%	17	3	3	15	12	2
244607071	839	70	1	8.33%	17	6	6	12	12	4
244607072	517	80	6	15.30%	15	3	11	11	13	10
244607073	876	75	5	8.51%	12	3	5	10	22	7
244607074	784	77	5	9.76%	20	2	14	7	16	2
244607075	785	124	6	15.68%	21	3	5	11	27	10
244607076	637	88	6	13.69%	14	2	3	14	26	5
244607077	918	86	11	9.26%	24	5	8	9	16	6

Table 1d.

PE November, 2021	Number of voters	Number of people who cast their vote	Additionally written under the page	Turnout	GERB-UDF	Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF	DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA– UNION (YES Bulgaria, Democrats for Free Bulgaria, Green Movement)	THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE	We Continue the Change	BSP for BULGARIA
244607070	536	89	7	16.39%	26	13	7	6	16	2
244607071	833	85	8	10.11%	31	8	6	3	11	5
244607072 <sup>8</sup>	517	83*	6	15.87%	20	8	6	4	17	10
244607073	866	86	6	9.86%	30	2	10	10	16	2
244607074	783	92	5	11.68%	33	6	14	8	15	2
244607075	785	124	6	15.68%	42	13	9	5	21	13
244607076	637	78	8	12.09%	29	10	7	5	8	2
244607077	921	106	14	11.34%	42	8	6	3	21	6

Figure 2. Total number of votes in risk stations for the period 2017-2022<sup>9</sup>



8. The protocol contains an error in the part concerning the number of voters in the polling list. As evident from the correction in the scanned protocols, the column for the number of voters contains data for the number of people who cast their vote.

9. Calculations are based on 1738 sections at risk with recurring risky behavior

The amount of the votes cast for the party winning in the stations at risk is 119 297 (4.92% of the votes cast in the country).

## Amount of the controlled and purchased vote by multi-mandate polling districts (MMPD)

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### Share of the votes cast in stations at risk, of all votes in the country

Most votes at risk in the country are cast in Kardzhali 9th MMPD – 8.96% (18983) of all ballots given in stations at risk, followed by Burgas 2nd MMPD – 7.75% (16 425), Blagoevgrad 1st MMPD – 5.96% (12 625), Haskovo 29th MMPD – 5.31% (11 250). The lowest number of votes at risk are cast in Sofia 25 (MMPD) – 0.67% (1422), Kyustendil 10th MMPD – 0.52% (1105), Sofia 23 (MMPD) – 0.38% (796).

### Share of the votes cast in stations at risk of all the votes in the multi-mandate polling district

The most significant share of votes at risk compared to all votes at the level of a multi-mandate polling district is observed in the Kardzhali 9th MMPD – 27.04% (or 18 983 votes, a 7.18% growth compared to November 2021 PE). Next come the Dobrich 8th MMPD with 18.78% (or 9738 votes, a 2,74% growth compared to the November 2021 PE), the Montana 12th MMPD with 16.78% (or 8030 votes, a 13,66% growth compared to the November 2021 PE ) and the Targovishte 28th MMPD with 16.65% (or 6705 votes, a 10.35% growth). The lowest share is reported in Sofia 24 MMPD – 1.12% (or 1631 votes, a 5.57% growth compared to the November 2021 PE), Sofia 25 MMPD with 0.98% (or 1422, a 7,13% growth compared to the November 2021 PE ), Sofia 23 MMPD with 0.37% (or 796, a -6.34% decrease compared to the November 2021 PE).

### Change in the turnout of the stations at risk, by multi-mandate polling districts

The highest growth of the number of people who cast their vote in stations at risk by MMPDs is reported in Plovdiv (city) 16th MMPD, where we observe a 41.74% growth (of 4068 votes compared to 2870 in November 2021). There are similar cases – Pazardzhik 13th MMPD with a 35.46% growth (from 7112 to 9634 votes), Vidin 5th MMPD with 23.86% (from 3508 to 4345), and Kyustendil 10th MMPD with 20.11% (from 920 to 1105 votes).

Values similar to the ones from the previous elections are observed in the Gabrovo 7th MMPD (2.66%), Burgas 2nd MMPD (2.10%), Vratsa 6th MMPD (-0.28%), Silistra 20th MMPD (-1.23%).

In the Yambol 31st MMPD, there is a decrease of the votes at risk of -9.93% (or 1802 compared to 1623 votes). Similar are the values for the Pleven 15th MMPD with a -9,01% decrease (from 7162 to 6517 votes), Sofia Region 26th MMPD with a -6.33% decrease (from 6004 to 562 votes), and the Smolyan 22nd MMPD with s -6.34% decrease (from 3 976 to 3724 votes).

## Amount of the controlled and purchased vote by municipalities

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### Share of the votes cast in stations at risk, of all votes in the country.

The vote at risk with the heaviest weight is the one in the Kardzhali municipality, where 3.25% (6892 votes) of all ballots at risk in the country are cast. Next comes the Haskovo municipality with 3.06% (6477 votes), followed by the Kirkovo municipality with 2.92% (6186 votes), and Plovdiv municipality (4068 votes). The least significant weight of the votes at risk is reported in the municipalities of Shabla, with 0.01% (30 votes) and Mirkovo with 0.02% (32).

### Share of the votes cast in stations at risk, of all the votes in the municipality.

Most serious problems with the controlled vote at the last elections are reported in the municipality of Kirkovo, where 61.08% (4276 votes) of the votes are at risk, followed by the municipalities of Dobirch 59.49% (1953 votes), Kotel 58.20% (109 votes), Tervel 57.94% (1363), Krivodol 57.63% (1 394 votes) and Hitrino (1447 votes).

Controlled and purchased vote are least observed in the Capital (Sofia) municipality at 0.76% (3849 votes)

### Change in the turnout of the stations at risk, by municipalities

The municipalities reporting most significant decrease are Gorna Malina with 44.83% (from 116 to 64 votes), Samokov with -41.46% (from 2 774 to 1624), and Banite with 38.87% (from 283 to 173 votes). Other municipalities reporting a considerable decrease are Levski, with 27.85% (from 905 to 653), and Knezha, with -16.04% (from 935 to 785).

Burgas Municipality, which reported a decrease in the previous elections, now keeps relative values. In November 2021, 1078 votes were cast in stations at risk there, and in the October 2022 elections – 1145 votes. The cases of Ruse (from 1489 to 1444) and Maglizh (from 281 to 261) are similar.

However, in other municipalities, like Plovdiv, where as early as November 2021, there was an increase in the turnout in the stations at risk, now there is a further 40% growth compared to the previous elections. The situation is similar in Chirpan (from 557 to 951), Septemvri (from 1675 to 2901), and Ihtiman (from 959 to 1702), where this vote increases by 70%.

## Vote at risk by political parties

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In October 2022, most votes at risk were received by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms – 88 400 votes or 14 thousand votes more compared to November 2021. These are 41.7% of the votes at risk in the country.

GERB-UDF also reports growth of 8 thousand votes in stations at risk. These are 49 000 votes or 23.1% of the votes at risk.


“We Continue the Change” takes 9.3% of the votes at risk or 19 700 votes, comparable to their November 2021 results.

BSP takes 17 000 of the votes at risk cast or 8.03% of all votes at risk. They report a decrease of 4500 votes compared to November 2021.

Democratic Bulgaria receives 2.3% or 5000 votes in stations at risk. These values are comparable to their results in the past year.

Renaissance receives 4.30% or 9100 votes at risk, and the Bulgarian Rise coalition receives 4300 or 2% of the votes at risk.

**Figure 3. Distribution of votes in polling stations at risk by political party (high outlier threshold), PE2021 November and PE2022 October**



**Weight of the votes at risk for the result of each of the parties:**

The share of the votes at risk in the overall result of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms is 30.5%, compared to 29.1 in November 2021.

As regards GERB-UDF, there is also a slight increase in the share of votes at risk compared to all of their votes – from 7.1% in November 2021 to 7.91% in October 2022.

We Continue the Change received 4.21% of their votes in stations at risk, compared to 3.20% in November 2021.


The Bulgarian Socialist Party received 7.4% of its votes in stations at risk in October 2022, compared to 8.2% in November 2021.

2.9% of all the votes for Democratic Bulgaria are at risk .

4% of the votes for Renaissance are cast in stations at risk.

Bulgarian Rise receives 3.82% from votes at risk.

Figure 4. Distribution of the votes for political parties cast in polling stations at risk (in at least two PE, 2013-2021), PE2021 November and PE2022



## Part 2

# Which stations showed deviations at the parliamentary elections in October 2022?

The second part of the analysis explores the results of the application of the methodology for registering sections with deviations in the results for this parliamentary elections.

## Number of polling stations at higher risk of controlled and purchased

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Unusually high values, both in terms of turnout and the leading party result compared to the turnout and the leading party's result in the municipality, are registered in 10<sup>10</sup> stations.

An unusually high difference between the turnout at the parliamentary elections in November 2021 and October 2022 is reported in 108 stations (at a high threshold for determining extreme values) – see graph 2. With the third model for determination of stations at risk, we look for sharp changes in the political preferences for all historically comparable political subjects – GERB-UDF, We Continue the Change, Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF, Renaissance, BSP, There is Such a People and Democratic Bulgaria. The same thresholds were applied to determine an extreme value for the differences in the results of each party in the elections in November 2021 and in October<sup>11</sup>.

### Restrictions of the methodology:

Although the methodology considers the overall change in the political preferences at a municipal level, one should bear in mind that the reasons for the deviations in certain stations may as well have no relation to controlled or purchased vote.

The application of this model at the parliamentary elections in October 2022 showed a sharp change in the political preferences of voters in 940<sup>12</sup> stations (at a high threshold for determining extreme values) to 1395 stations (at a low threshold for determining extreme values) (see graph 1 and 2).

10. The introduction of machine voting removed the high number of invalid voting papers and votes. As noted in the previous chapter, this indicator was excluded from the multi-component behavior model.

11.  $Q3+2.2*(IQR)$  for a low threshold and  $Q3+3*(IQR)$  for a high threshold

12. 492 stations at a high threshold and 666 stations at a low threshold are a part of the list of 1738.

**Table 1 Application of models for the determination of stations at risk (low threshold)<sup>13</sup>**

	Multicomponent unusual behaviour	Turnover deviations (low threshold)	Volatility (low threshold)	Total number of stations <sup>13</sup>	Share of stations at risk %	Number of voters (low outlier threshold)	Share of voters %
Parliamentary elections 2021 November	45	36	849	913	7.3	129 357	5.3
Parliamentary elections 2022 October	40	236	1395	1429	11.7	193 456	8

**Table 2. Application of models for the determination of stations at risk (high threshold)**

	Multicomponent unusual behaviour	Turnover deviations (high threshold)	Volatility (high threshold)	Total number of stations <sup>14</sup>	Share of stations at risk %	Number of voters (high outlier threshold)	Share of voters %
Parliamentary elections 2021 November	45	26	572	629	5	89 891	3.7
Parliamentary elections 2022 October	10	108	930	940	7.7	126 106	5.2

The difference in the parties' results is negative in 412 stations at the low threshold and 266 stations at a high threshold for volatility.. In other words, in the previous elections there was a high result, which drops with asymmetric proportions at these elections<sup>15</sup>. This indicates that it is likely that the stations in question were subject to controlled voting at the previous elections.. From our analysis's standpoint , these stations show the potential to be at risk, and they are, therefore, still included in our methodology. We assume that these stations will cease to be at risk if they show low values in terms of the volatility indicator in two elections in a row.<sup>16</sup>

### Restrictions of the methodology:

When there is a lower number of stations in a municipality (e.g., less than 10 stations), it is possible to control the vote there en block. In such cases, the correction of the volatility and turnover deviations with the results from the whole municipality would result in excluding such stations. You can see the results of stations in such municipalities without correction at <https://acf.bg/en/malki-obshtini/>.

13. Certain stations may deviate in more than one model

14. Certain stations may deviate in more than one model

15. Calculated by the formula: The absolute value of (Result of the party at the Parliamentary Elections of October 2022 – Result of the party at the Parliamentary Elections of November 2021), lightened by the difference in the party's results on a municipal level.

16. You can see the results based on the formula: Party's result at the Parliamentary Elections of October 2022 – Result of the party at the Parliamentary Elections of November 2021), corrected with the difference in the party's results on a municipal level, where the parties show only an increase in this indicator, at: <https://acf.bg/bg/rezultati-volatilnost/>

The share of stations at risk in the parliamentary elections in October 2022 varies from 5% (low threshold) to 7,8% (high threshold) of the total number of stations in the country. These values, like the preceding part of the analysis, are positioned as higher than those at the elections in November 2021 and lower than those at the July elections in 2021. 100% of the stations identified by the models as at risk in October 2021 are identified as such based on the results from the PE in 2013, PE in 2014, PE in 2017, and PE in 2021, April, and PE in July 2021 and the parliamentary elections in November 2021. .

## Number of voters and number of votes for the winner in the stations

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Upon application of the models with low threshold for determining extreme values, the number of voters in the stations at risk in October 2022 equals 193 546 voters, and when applying a high threshold – 126 105 voters. This is 5.2% to 7,98%, respectively, of the votes cast in the country. Assuming that the purchased vote consists mainly of votes cast by the winner in the station, the number of votes at risk is ranges from 62 672 to 92 907 votes. This is 2.58% to 385% of the votes cast in the country.

## Amount of the controlled and purchased vote by polling districts

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The most serious problem with the controlled and purchased vote at the October 2022<sup>17</sup>, parliamentary elections in concerning the votes cast in stations at risk compared to all the votes in the district (see graph 3), is observed in Targovishte (14.53%), 11th multi-mandate polling district Lovech (13.53%), Montana (13.22%) and Silistra (12.68%). Burgas Multi-mandate polling district, measured in April last year as a particularly risky one, but in July and November showed lower values, confirms the trend, and shows 3.77%.

Regarding the results of the winners by multi-mandate polling districts, the leader is the Targovishte multi-mandate polling district, followed by the Silistra multi-mandate polling district, the Razgrad multi-mandate polling district, and the Montana multi-mandate polling district.

For a second time in a row, in terms of the indicator “highest share of the votes at risk in the country,” the highest values at the October 2022 parliamentary elections are reported in the Pazardzhik multi-mandate polling district (5.59% of all votes at risk), at the previous elections the reported values there were 8.7%. The Pazardzhik multi-mandate polling district is followed by the Blagoevgrad multi-mandate polling district (4.85%) and Stara Zagora (4.82%). Veliko Tarnovo multi-mandate polling district reports a decrease as it goes down from 7.1% to 4.16%, comparable to the July elections values.

In terms of this indicator, the lowest values are reported in the Sofia 24th multi-mandate polling district (0.27%), Sofia 23rd multi-mandate polling district (0.38%), Sofia 25th multi-mandate polling district (0.43%), and Pernik 14th multi-mandate polling district (0.76%).


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<sup>17</sup> The enclosed values are from calculations based on a high threshold.

**Table 3. Size of potential controlled or purchased votes by multi-mandate polling district, PE 2022 October**

Electoral District	Votes cast in polling stations at risk within the district (% low outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk within the district (% high outlier threshold)	Votes for the winner in polling stations at risk (% low outlier threshold)	Votes for the winner in polling stations at risk (% high outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk out of all votes at risk (% low outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk out of all votes at risk (% high outlier threshold)
1 Blagoevgrad	8,04%	4,71%	4,50%	2,71%	4,36%	4,85%
2 Burgas	5,67%	3,77%	2,70%	1,72%	4,08%	3,99%
3 Varna	5,63%	4,28%	2,80%	2,19%	5,55%	4,76%
4 Veliko Tarnovo	10,76%	7,59%	4,18%	3,12%	4,50%	4,16%
5 Vidin	18,73%	11,09%	6,95%	4,42%	2,62%	2,88%
6 Vratsa	12,81%	7,84%	5,46%	3,47%	3,48%	3,71%
7 Gabrovo	4,64%	3,36%	2,07%	1,62%	1,00%	0,90%
8 Dobrich	13,54%	8,46%	6,10%	4,07%	3,48%	3,63%
9 Kardzhali	11,47%	6,96%	7,48%	4,90%	3,87%	4,16%
10 Kyustendil	5,33%	2,59%	1,79%	0,83%	0,86%	1,15%
11 Lovech	18,59%	13,53%	7,63%	5,75%	4,40%	3,94%
12 Montana	19,44%	13,22%	9,44%	6,51%	5,02%	4,81%
13 Pazardzik	13,63%	9,64%	7,45%	5,44%	6,07%	5,59%
14 Pernik	3,27%	2,32%	1,13%	0,78%	0,76%	0,70%
15 Pleven	11,14%	7,86%	4,72%	3,72%	4,71%	4,35%
16 Plovdiv (city)	3,18%	2,19%	1,62%	1,23%	2,07%	1,96%
17 Plovdiv (region)	8,65%	5,39%	3,93%	2,55%	3,99%	4,17%
18 Razgrad	17,59%	12,08%	10,13%	6,99%	4,10%	3,89%
19 Ruse	6,87%	3,26%	2,91%	1,55%	1,77%	2,43%
20 Silistra	16,08%	12,68%	9,44%	7,69%	4,19%	3,46%
21 Sliven	12,74%	7,34%	6,43%	3,73%	2,83%	3,20%
22 Smolyan	16,20%	9,54%	6,46%	3,69%	3,01%	3,33%
23 Sofia 23rd district	0,59%	0,23%	0,18%	0,07%	0,38%	0,65%
24 Sofia 24th district	0,58%	0,23%	0,19%	0,08%	0,27%	0,44%
25 Sofia 25th district	0,79%	0,37%	0,33%	0,20%	0,43%	0,59%
26 Sofia (region)	11,44%	6,88%	4,90%	3,00%	4,23%	4,58%
27 Stara Zagora	8,67%	6,03%	3,76%	2,61%	5,14%	4,82%
28 Targovishte	19,16%	14,53%	11,23%	8,31%	4,64%	3,99%
29 Haskovo	10,06%	4,95%	4,80%	2,35%	3,25%	4,30%
30 Shumen	11,57%	8,18%	6,40%	4,44%	3,77%	3,48%
31 Yambol	6,31%	4,23%	2,40%	1,74%	1,17%	1,13%

Figure 1. Size of potential controlled or purchased vot by multi -mandate polling district



## Amount of the controlled and paid vote by municipalities

For one-fourth of the municipalities, the share of the potentially purchased or controlled vote out of the total vote in the municipality is less than 1% (see Figure 4). For 104 municipalities, this value is in the range of 1 to 5 percent. In about 20% of the municipalities (52 municipalities), this percentage varies in the range of 5 to 10 percent. In 37 municipalities, the controlled vote reaches 10 to 25 percent. The share of potentially purchased and controlled vote is significant (more than 25%) in 4 of the municipalities.

Concentration of stations with deviations is present in the municipalities of Gurkovo (40.28%), Yakimovo (30.24%), Hayredin (56.15%), Teteven (40.20%), Brusartsi (46.42%), Bratya Daskalovi (46.42%), Hitrino (37,84%), Medkovets (37.28%), Zlataritsa (37.28%).

Figure 2. Dimension of the potential purchased vote from the total vote in the municipality, PE2022 October<sup>18</sup>





Figure 3. Dimensions of vote purchasing and manipulation by municipality, PE2022 October<sup>18</sup>



18 The enclosed values are from high-threshold-based calculations.


## Vote at risk by political parties

At the parliamentary elections in October 2022, MRF got the highest share of the votes cast in stations showing deviations in the results – 38.25%<sup>19</sup>. GERB-UDF received 23.92% of the vote at risk.

We Continue the Change receives 9.72% at the stations showing deviations at these elections, followed by BSP with 8.52%. Renaissance takes 4.82% of the votes in stations with deviant behavior. Bulgarian Rise takes 2.35% of the votes at risk.


MRF is still ahead as regards the share of the potential purchased and controlled votes out of the total number of votes for the specific party with 16.63% (see Figure 7). GERB-UDF and BSP report close values of 4.87% and 4.72%, respectively. Renaissance, We Continue the Change, and Bulgarian Rise receive a little over 2.6%, Democratic Bulgaria report 1.85% in deviant stations.

**Figure 4. Distribution of the votes cast in polling stations at risk, by political party (high outlier threshold), PE2022, October**



<sup>19</sup> Приложените стойности са от изчисления на базата на висок праг.

Figure 5. Percentage of votes for a political party cast at sections at risk, PE 2022 October<sup>20</sup>



<sup>20</sup> The data on the chart is only for the parties represented in the Parliament. Other parties that receive a high result in terms of this value are BUDD – Bulgarian Union for DIRECT DEMOCRACY 15.82%, BULGARIAN NATIONAL UNION – 13.40%, BULGARIAN NATIONAL UNION – NEW DEMOCRACY 10.97% AND PEOPLE’S PARTY TRUTH AND ONLY THE TRUTH 9.39%

# Part 3

## Preferential vote at risk


### What do we know about the “conventional” electoral behavior in the use of preferences.

Preferences are a mechanism for changing the order of the electoral lists, which allows more active involvement of citizens in making decisions for the parliamentary representation. At the same time, the experience gained from several elections after introducing preferences in Bulgaria has shown that they can indicate a controlled vote in two aspects. On the one hand, voters whose vote is controlled can be forced to specify a particular preference, which is subsequently used as a distinctive sign and serves to control the exact number of votes cast.

On the other hand, a large part of the purchased and controlled vote occurs under the conditions of an internal-party competition. In other words, candidates purchase votes autonomously from the party nominating them in order to change the order in the lists and to be elected in the national assembly or to “prove” their worthiness before the party management. In this sense, the measurement of the preferential vote is of crucial importance for understanding the controlled and purchased vote phenomenon.

Figures 1-7<sup>21</sup> visualise the preferential votes received: by parties, by multi-mandate polling districts and by participants in the electoral lists.

Figure 1. Coalition GERB-UDF



21 <https://data-for-good.bg/blog/preferential-voting-charts>

**Figure 2. We Continue the Change**



**Figure 3. Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF**




Figure 4. Renaissance




Figure 5. BSP FOR BULGARIA




Figure 6. Democratic Bulgaria





Figure 7. Bulgarian Rise



Graph 1 illustrates the ratio of the preferences used by parties to the votes received. The purpose of such a comparison is to determine the electoral behavior of the voters of the different parties concerning preferences used.

**Table 1. Preferential voting by parties**

	Preferences used 2022	Votes received for the party 2022	Share for 2022	Preferences used 2021	Votes received for the party 2021	Share for PE 2021, November
<b>DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA – UNION (YES Bulgaria, Democrats for Free Bulgaria, Green Movement)</b>	84751	169621	49.96%	77968	147528	52.85%
<b>GERB-UDF</b>	273521	619228	44.17%	218453	575195	37.98%
<b>BSP FOR BULGARIA</b>	88765	229304	38.71%	79132	260665	30.36%
<b>Bulgarian RISE</b>	42383	112467	37.68%	–	–	–
<b>There is Such a People</b>	31628	87933	35.97%	55474	223132	24.86%
<b>We Continue the Change</b>	148316	467897	31.70%	151777	620568	24.46%
<b>Renaissance</b>	65223	230138	28.34%	29618	112033	26.44%
<b>Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF</b>	64712	289992	22.32%	41735	252367	16.54%

The aggregated data shows that at the parliamentary elections in October 2022, the voters who most actively used preferences were the ones of the Democratic Bulgaria coalition – almost every second vote cast by them was with a preference.

As regards the GERB-UDF coalition, 44% of the voters used preferences.

Preferences are least used by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms voters – only 22.32% of all of their votes are with preferences.

We calculated the variance of the random variable (a measure of the spread of a set of numbers from their average value) to isolate the unusual cases in which the concentration of preferential votes is unusually high or, in other words, obtaining a high number of preferences in a small number of sections.

**The considerable concentration of preferences in a small number of sections is a possible indication of mechanisms for impacting the final election result.**

## Results by parties

	Extract size – parliamentary elections October 2022	Variance of the extract – parliamentary elections October 2022	Extract size – parliamentary elections November 2021	Variance of the extract
GERB-UDF	66298	77.29365	50872	70.6531
Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF	21117	68.20672	15674	43.09413
We Continue the Change	50436	20.20625	36495	25.4544
BSP FOR BULGARIA	33862	19.64263	28640	21.55962
POLITICAL PARTY VMRO – BULGARIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT	6375	10.16454	6553	6.3385
DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA – UNION (YES Bulgaria, Democrats for Free Bulgaria, Green Movement)	33113	9.441827	29292	5.86166
BULGARIAN RISE	21079	6.648351	–	–
RENAISSANCE	32701	5.206633	17187	1.752239
POLITICAL PARTY THERE IS SUCH PEOPLE	18856	1.968337	28313	3.108799543
POLITICAL PARTY RISE UP, BULGARIA	6629	1.225171	12734	3.925449815
MORALITY, INITIATIVE, PATRIOTISM	1421	0.653552	–	–
NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE SALVATION OF BULGARIA	1027	0.645208	683	0.311651507
CUR (Conservative Union of the Right)	1333	0.598955	–	–
Just Bulgaria Coalition	2600	0.367183	–	–
PEOPLE'S VOICE POLITICAL PARTY	1696	0.272538	1791	0.085208
MOVEMENT OF NON-PARTY CANDIDATES	2438	0.260597	–	–
ATAKA	1986	0.238965	1915	0.136955
BULGARIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY – EUROLEFT	1383	0.226011	2146	0.062305
POLITICAL PARTY FOR YOU BULGARIA COALITION	1012	0.224574	–	–
RUSSOPHILES FOR RENAISSANCE OF THE MOTHER COUNTRY	1466	0.186887	1386	0.157820735
DIRECT DEMOCRACY	662	0.154409	119	0.016524
BULGARIAN NATIONAL UNION	346	0.124394	359	0.074891
BUDD – Bulgarian Union for DIRECT DEMOCRACY	1300	0.122578	–	–
THE LAW	398	0.097706	691	0.041044565
PEOPLE'S PARTY TRUTH AND ONLY THE TRUTH	525	0.096508	–	–

What is impressive about this indicator is that the variance is considerably higher for GERB-UDF. An even more curious fact is that regardless of the low level of use of preferences for MRF, MRF ranks second in the variance indicator.

We made the same measurement at a candidate level too. We are posting a list of the thirty candidates having the highest concentration.<sup>22</sup>

### Results by candidate

Candidate's name	Variance	VOTES
Nikolay Borisov Argirov	5609.9	1213
Stefan Apostolov Apostolov	3567.986	7357
Osman Osmanov Misirkov	1575.034	1141
Aleksandar Hristov Metodiev	1509.637	759
Erik Yusufov Feyziev	1015.585	451
Dimitar Ivanov Gechev	1003.288	2835
Fatima Ismail Yildiz	904.4108	729
Rryhan Sabri Hussein	876.4121	262
Ayshe Mustafaova Mazgaldzhieva	809.5442	308
Aydan Nesib Mohammed	561.7154	804
Gyunay Hyusmen Hyusmen	538.5105	2725
Georgi Tenev Stankov	510.0335	4617
Dzhalil Selim Boshnak	495.3386	257
Kostadin Tomov Stoykov	486.6665	4163
Ilter Beyzatov Sadakov	479.4977	2605
Ibryam Aliev Mustafafov	461.0944	1154
Diyan Vatsov Vatsov	425.9743	564
Nikolay Kirilov Georgeiv	399.8604	1762
Mladen Nikolov Shishkov	395.6179	2956
Stefan Nedelchev Mirev	385.812	4921
Sezer Sevgin Shaban	385.5	140
Bogdan Emilov Botsev	375.0594	2102
Muhlis Fariz Serbest	370.7978	156
Ventsislav Kostadinov Garmenov	366.5175	1276
Pavel Dimitrov Pahnev	362.1924	947
Sabri Mustafafov Sabriev	319.32	300
Ivan Dimitrov Grancharov	313.5558	1223
Mastan Osmanov Mastanov	309.4992	344
Slavena Dimitrova Tocheva	307.5562	7306

<sup>22</sup> You can see the entire list here: <https://acf.bg/bg/preferentsii-2022/>

## Stations with high preference concentration

In 144<sup>23,24</sup> stations in the country, there is a considerable concentration of preferences, i.e., more than 85 percent of preference vote for a candidate of all the votes cast for the party that nominated them, or 13 909 preferences. The municipalities where the most serious problem is reported are Simitli – 5237 votes cast in such stations, Ihtiman – 939, Kresna – 919, and Samokov – 501.

When it comes to parties, the concentration is as follows. GERB-UDF receive 8792 votes (63%) in such stations, BSP FOR BULGARIA – 2183 (16%), Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF 1770 (13 %), DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA – UNION (YES Bulgaria, Democrats for Free Bulgaria, Green Movement) – 1770 (4%)

GERB-UDF	8792
BSP FOR BULGARIA	2183
Movement for Rights and Freedoms – MRF	1770
DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA – UNION (YES Bulgaria, Democrats for Free Bulgaria, Green Movement)	563
POLITICAL PARTY VMRO – BULGARIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT	198
WE CONTINUE THE CHANGE	176
BULGARIAN RISE	171
POLITICAL PARTY THERE IS SUCH PEOPLE	35
MORALITY, INITIATIVE, PATRIOTISM	21

23 You can see the entire list here: <https://acf.bg/bg/seksii-s-golyam-broy-preferentsii/>

24 The calculations do not include the stations with less than 20 preferences.

## Part 4

### Deviations in the present registrations

One of the possible election schemes is registering people at an address other than their actual address so that they vote<sup>25</sup> in a specific multi-mandate polling district or municipality to affect the election results at the location concerned. A note must be made that such mechanisms are used much more frequently at local elections because a much lower number of votes wins a mandate.

There was a similar case in April 2021 in the municipality of Gurkovo. An investigation by Valya Ahchieva in the past year has shown that in Gurkovo, Tvarditsa, and Panicherevo<sup>26,27</sup> residents receive money to re-register en masse immediately before the election date.

According to the stated data, the mayor of Gurkovo, Marian Tsonev, was officially charged with criminal offenses against the political rights of citizens.

The Anti-Corruption Fund has sent official inquiries after the April and July Parliamentary elections) about the number of persons who stated they would vote at their present address in the Gurkovo municipality. The answers showed us that in the last two months before the elections on 4 April 2021, 400 persons were registered in Gurkovo who had filed applications to vote at their present address. Shortly after the elections, they returned to their former address. Two months before the July elections, the persons who filed applications were only 15. (Graph 3 and 4)

СПРАВКА ПО ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ЗА ДОСТЪП ДО ОБЩЕСТВЕНА ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОТ ФОНДАЦИЯ „АНТИКОРУПЦИОНЕН ФОНД“		
№ по ред	ПЕРИОД	БРОЙ
I.	ЛИЦА, ПРОМЕНИЛИ НАСТОЯЩИЯ СИ АДРЕС ЗА ПЕРИОД	БРОЙ ПОДАДЕНИ АК
1.	01.01.2021 – 31.01.2021	6
2.	01.02.2021 – 28.02.2021	255
3.	01.03.2021 – 20.03.2021	182
II.	БРОЙ ЛИЦА ОТ Т. I, ПОДАЛИ ЗАЯВЛЕНИЯ ЗА ГЛАСУВАНЕ ПО НАСТОЯЩ АДРЕС ЗА ПАРЛАМЕНТАРНИТЕ ИЗБОРИ, ПРОИЗВЕДЕНИ НА 04.04.2021 Г.	406
III.	БРОЙ ЛИЦА, ПРОМЕНИЛИ НАСТОЯЩИЯ СИ АДРЕС ОТ ЕДНО НАСЕЛЕНО МЯСТО В ДРУГО НАСЕЛЕНО МЯСТО НА ТЕРИТОРИЯТА НА ОБЩИНА ГУРКОВО	
1.	01.01.2021 – 31.01.2021	0
2.	01.02.2021 – 28.02.2021	0
3.	01.03.2021 – 20.03.2021	3

<sup>25</sup> These persons must be registered in the respective polling lists; the voting can also be carried out by someone else, like in the Gurkovo case.

<sup>26</sup> [https://www.dnevnik.bg/video/valia\\_ahchieva/2021/04/23/4202510\\_teftercheto\\_s\\_cifri\\_i\\_izborite\\_v\\_gurkovo/](https://www.dnevnik.bg/video/valia_ahchieva/2021/04/23/4202510_teftercheto_s_cifri_i_izborite_v_gurkovo/)


<sup>27</sup> In the Stara Zagora multi-mandate polling district

**СПРАВКА  
ПО ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ЗА ДОСТЪП ДО ОБЩЕСТВЕНА ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОТ ФОНДАЦИЯ  
„АНТИКОРУПЦИОНЕН ФОНД“**


№ по ред	ПЕРИОД	БРОИ
<b>I.</b>	<b>ЛИЦА, ПРОМЕНИЛИ НАСТОЯЩИЯ СИ АДРЕС ЗА ПЕРИОД</b>	<b>БРОЙ ПОДАДЕНИ АК</b>
1.	01.04.2021 – 30.04.2021	6
2.	01.05.2021 – 31.05.2021	9
3.	01.06.2021 – 30.06.2021	6
<b>II.</b>	<b>БРОЙ ЛИЦА ОТ Т.І, ПОДАЛИ ЗАЯВЛЕНИЯ ЗА ГЛАСУВАНЕ ПО НАСТОЯЩ АДРЕС ЗА ПАРЛАМЕНТАРНИТЕ ИЗБОРИ, КОИТО ЩЕ БЪДАТ ПРОИЗВЕДЕНИ НА 11.07.2021 Г.</b>	3
<b>III.</b>	<b>БРОЙ ЛИЦА, ПРОМЕНИЛИ НАСТОЯЩИЯ СИ АДРЕС ОТ ЕДНО НАСЕЛЕНО МЯСТО В ДРУГО НАСЕЛЕНО МЯСТО НА ТЕРИТОРИЯТА НА ОБЩИНА ГУРКОВО</b>	0
1.	01.04.2021 – 30.04.2021	0
2.	01.05.2021 – 31.05.2021	0
3.	01.06.2021 – 30.06.2021	0

The graph shows that in April 2021 the population of the Gurkovo municipality surged and how – two months later – it went back to its previous values. There was also a proportional increase in the votes for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which nominated the mayor. In the July 2021 elections, these 427 voters did not return to Gurkovo, and the MRF’s performance proportionally went down.

**Figure 1. Results of MRF, Gurkovo municipality**




**Figure 2. Turnout in %, Gurkovo municipality**



## How does Gurkovo municipality acts, when the electoral tourism is eliminated?

	March 2017	Percentage change	April 2021	Percentage change	July 2021
Size of the polling sections	4203	+11,35%	4680	-9,12%	4253
Results of the Movement of Rights and Freedom	476	+212,39%	1487	-54,53%	676
Turnout as %	59,47	+8,62%	68,09	+13,57	54,52

**Figure 3. Size of the sections in Gurkovo municipality**



Using the data on the number of the population in the settlements of the Republic of Bulgaria according to their permanent and present address, provided by the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works (MRDPW)<sup>28</sup> ACF tried to create a method for surveying this and other similar cases across the country<sup>29</sup>. We did so by comparing the percentage change by months and a standard deviation<sup>30,31,32</sup>. In this way, we found Gurkovo, Tvarditsa, and Panicherevo to prove the concept.

We are interested in both considerable increases in the registrations at the present address and decreases due to the presumption that voters who are re-registered must be, from the outset, removed from the registration at their actual address. The values that stood out were also checked for a cyclic nature (seasonal nature), i.e., whether such deviations are registered because of an objective reason, such as, e.g., employment in the summer seasons. In addition, they were checked for deviations in the vote, as the ones showing no change were excluded.

<sup>28</sup> <https://data.egov.bg/organisation/dataset/a39ad94c-adf4-478a-af48-957ea1941a3d>

<sup>29</sup> See complete data on <https://acf.bg/bg/danni-mrrb/>

<sup>30</sup> The standard deviation measures the dispersion of a set of values. A low standard deviation shows that the values are close to the average value and a high standard deviation indicates that the values are dispersed on a broader range.

<sup>31</sup> We have found cases where the standard deviation exceeds 3% of the value for the first month being examined. Various periods were also tested – 6, 9, 12, and 24 months before the elections. The 9-month breakdown has proven to be the most reliable.

<sup>32</sup> The calculation also included places where less than 45 residents are registered as having present addresses, but they were excluded because a low absolute growth or decrease results in high deviations.

A limitation of this method is that the data of the MRDPW are released on a monthly basis (every 15th day of the month). In other words, if the registration and re-registration of the voters in question take place over a period shorter than that, they will not be reflected in the posted data. Besides, sometimes there are objective reasons for such growth and decrease, such as the case of the re-registrations in the villages of Razdol and Kamenitsa, Strumyani municipality, on account of the closing of hospital establishments and allocation of their users.

## Results

As noted above, during parliamentary elections, these phenomena take place less frequently.

The highest standard deviation (see graph 7) compared to the initial value is observed for those registered at their present address in the village of Byal Kladenets, Stambolovo municipality – 20% (from 95 to 114), the village of Skalak, Krumovgrad municipality – 17% (from 131 to 158), the village of Malko Kamenyane – 14% (from 125 to 147).

We can conclude that, at the Parliamentary elections in 2022, there were no serious deviations in the present registrations.

Populated area <sup>33</sup>	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	% against	standard deviation	% of the standard deviation from the base value
Haskovo, Stambolovo, Village of Byal kladenets	95	95	95	94	100	109	111	114	114	20%	8.326664	8.76%
Kardzhali, Krumovgrad, Village of Skalak	132	132	137	137	141	143	144	155	158	20%	8.697949	6.59%
Kardzhali, Krumovgrad, Village of Malko Kamenyane	126	127	129	136	139	144	144	145	147	17%	7.818939	6.21%
Kardzhali, Dzhebel, Village of Kazatsite	99	100	102	102	104	108	110	110	112	13%	4.565031	4.61%
Kardzhali, Kirkovo, Village of Parventsii	83	83	83	84	86	91	89	94	93	12%	4.242641	5.11%
Haskovo, Stambolovo, Village of Voyvodenets	120	121	122	124	127	127	129	134	136	13%	5.291503	4.41%
Veliko Tarnovo, Veliko Tarnovo, Village of Dichin	234	235	258	257	257	257	254	255	254	9%	9.040376	3.86%
Kardzhali, Dzhebel, Village of Zheladovo	141	144	144	149	153	154	154	155	155	10%	5.216309	3.70%
Dobrich, Tervel, Village of Bonevo	131	131	131	130	129	134	134	139	145	11%	4.871118	3.72%
Haskovo, Stambolovo, Village of Pchelari	287	287	288	291	300	308	309	311	315	10%	10.81266	3.77%

<sup>33</sup> The graph lists only examples of an increase in the present address in populated areas where an increase in the activity and/or result of a party, or another deviation, is observed

Populated area <sup>33</sup>	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	% against	standard deviation	% of the standard deviation from the base value
Kardzhali, Dzhebel, Village of Tarnovtsi	93	93	92	94	95	95	96	98	104	12%	3.435472	3.69%
Haskovo, Ivaylovgrad, Village of Plevun	126	125	123	123	123	127	132	135	135	7%	4.737557	3.76%

### Recommendation

Such a phenomenon can be measured much more precisely if a register of the applications for voting at the present address is developed and maintained at the level of administrative units, as well as through the more frequent release of the data of MRDPW. As mentioned above, in case of a quick registration and re-registration of voters, such problematic deviations may even not be registered in the information statements of the MRDPW for the specific period. ACF will make a proposal to the responsible institutions to maintain such a database for the purposes of analytical activity and prevention.

# Appendix

## Dimension of controlled and purchased vote by municipalities, PE2022, October

Municipality	Votes cast in polling stations at risk within the municipality (% low outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk within the municipality (% high outlier threshold)	Votes for the winner in polling stations at risk within the municipality (% low outlier threshold)	Votes for the winner in polling stations at risk within the municipality (% high outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk out of all votes at risk (% low outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk out of all votes at risk (% high outlier threshold)
AKSAKOVO	8,21%	4,68%	3,62%	1,85%	0,30%	0,27%
ALFATAR	10,66%	10,66%	7,95%	7,95%	0,06%	0,09%
ANTON	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
ANTONOVO	12,42%	12,42%	9,09%	9,09%	0,18%	0,27%
APRILTSI	4,39%	0,00%	1,27%	0,00%	0,02%	0,00%
ARDINO	7,00%	7,00%	4,77%	4,77%	0,24%	0,38%
ASENOVGRAD	7,57%	4,55%	4,55%	2,60%	0,82%	0,76%
AVREN	28,56%	23,67%	13,22%	11,12%	0,44%	0,56%
AYTOS	13,27%	5,57%	7,26%	3,01%	0,60%	0,39%
BALCHIK	22,37%	21,39%	9,51%	9,33%	0,58%	0,85%
BANITE	25,81%	17,88%	8,94%	6,45%	0,20%	0,21%
BANSKO	17,21%	4,44%	6,09%	1,71%	0,46%	0,18%
BATAK	7,65%	0,00%	1,83%	0,00%	0,10%	0,00%
BELENE	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
BELITSA	13,68%	4,99%	9,76%	1,87%	0,34%	0,19%
BELOGRADCHIK	20,53%	7,50%	5,78%	2,39%	0,22%	0,12%
BELOSLAV	4,76%	4,76%	1,93%	1,93%	0,07%	0,10%
BELOVO	9,76%	9,76%	2,74%	2,74%	0,14%	0,21%
BERKOVITSA	8,75%	0,00%	5,18%	0,00%	0,25%	0,00%
BLAGOEVGRAD	3,23%	2,59%	1,22%	0,96%	0,47%	0,57%
BOBOSHEVO	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
BOBOV DOL	9,17%	9,17%	2,60%	2,60%	0,12%	0,18%
BOLYAROVO	3,35%	3,35%	1,49%	1,49%	0,03%	0,04%
BORINO	19,12%	9,01%	9,26%	4,08%	0,16%	0,12%
BOROVAN	14,38%	9,11%	6,21%	3,72%	0,14%	0,14%
BOROVO	22,28%	14,58%	6,81%	4,81%	0,17%	0,17%
BOTEVGRAD	12,42%	6,95%	3,63%	2,05%	0,65%	0,55%
BOYNITSA	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
BOYTCHINOVTSI	11,67%	11,67%	3,47%	3,47%	0,16%	0,25%
BOZHURISHTA	2,01%	0,00%	0,59%	0,00%	0,03%	0,00%
BRATSIGOVO	6,17%	6,17%	2,24%	2,24%	0,07%	0,11%
BRATYA DASKALOVI	37,84%	37,84%	20,54%	20,54%	0,43%	0,66%

BREGOVO	21,97%	21,97%	7,70%	7,70%	0,24%	0,37%
BREZNIK	1,88%	0,00%	0,63%	0,00%	0,02%	0,00%
BREZOVO	8,96%	2,45%	3,36%	0,59%	0,09%	0,04%
BRUSARTSI	46,42%	46,42%	24,45%	24,45%	0,49%	0,76%
BURGAS	1,44%	0,99%	0,45%	0,33%	0,53%	0,56%
BYALA	12,22%	12,22%	4,81%	4,81%	0,06%	0,10%
BYALA SLATINA	29,52%	13,50%	14,48%	7,48%	1,26%	0,88%
CHAVDAR	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
CHELOPECH	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
CHEPELARE	8,57%	8,57%	4,10%	4,10%	0,10%	0,15%
CHERNOOCHENE	11,69%	9,28%	8,56%	7,25%	0,28%	0,34%
CHERVEN BRYAG	16,74%	15,90%	7,96%	7,71%	0,63%	0,92%
CHIPROVTSI	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
CHIRPAN	7,49%	3,61%	2,65%	1,44%	0,22%	0,16%
CHUPRENE	41,10%	24,41%	12,60%	6,61%	0,13%	0,12%
DALGOPOL	22,12%	20,46%	14,07%	13,37%	0,56%	0,79%
DEVIN	10,26%	5,01%	3,23%	1,95%	0,19%	0,14%
DEVNYA	9,07%	0,00%	5,41%	0,00%	0,13%	0,00%
DIMITROVGRAD	8,17%	2,87%	2,81%	0,84%	0,66%	0,35%
DIMOVO	39,77%	17,23%	15,53%	7,06%	0,47%	0,31%
DOBRICH-CITY	3,28%	2,53%	0,92%	0,73%	0,44%	0,52%
DOBRICHKA	31,03%	13,83%	13,58%	7,42%	1,01%	0,69%
DOLNA BANYA	18,13%	0,00%	15,18%	0,00%	0,19%	0,00%
DOLNA MITROPOLIYA	9,80%	4,73%	4,01%	2,55%	0,22%	0,17%
DOLNI CHIFLIK	34,46%	26,53%	17,73%	14,89%	0,84%	0,99%
DOLNI DABNIK	36,70%	23,96%	16,93%	11,08%	0,55%	0,55%
DOSPAT	5,66%	0,00%	2,24%	0,00%	0,09%	0,00%
DRAGOMAN	6,16%	4,01%	2,38%	1,45%	0,05%	0,05%
DRYANOVO	10,49%	10,49%	4,53%	4,53%	0,15%	0,24%
DULOVO	32,21%	29,10%	20,76%	18,94%	1,59%	2,20%
DUPNITSA	5,88%	4,66%	2,12%	1,49%	0,43%	0,52%
DVE MOGILI	15,36%	11,58%	5,65%	4,55%	0,17%	0,19%
DZHEBEL	4,85%	4,85%	4,48%	4,48%	0,14%	0,22%
ELENA	21,21%	15,98%	8,30%	5,75%	0,34%	0,39%
ELHOVO	3,45%	1,41%	1,44%	0,81%	0,07%	0,04%
ELIN PELIN	10,65%	5,99%	2,59%	1,56%	0,36%	0,31%
ETROPOLE	7,87%	2,46%	1,59%	0,51%	0,16%	0,08%
GABROVO	1,59%	0,85%	0,85%	0,46%	0,17%	0,14%
GALABOVO	3,96%	1,36%	1,68%	0,59%	0,07%	0,04%
GARMEN	16,90%	13,18%	9,58%	8,57%	0,58%	0,70%
GENERAL TOSHEVO	19,75%	9,96%	6,55%	3,71%	0,35%	0,27%
GEORGI DAMYANOVO	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%

GLAVINITSA	21,97%	10,89%	13,19%	6,46%	0,54%	0,41%
GODECH	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
GORNA MALINA	14,30%	14,30%	4,22%	4,22%	0,15%	0,22%
GORNA ORYAHOVITSA	5,94%	5,71%	1,50%	1,42%	0,43%	0,63%
GOTSE DELCHEV	1,90%	1,90%	1,49%	1,49%	0,11%	0,16%
GRAMADA	33,98%	10,43%	9,24%	4,02%	0,12%	0,06%
GULYANTSI	7,98%	0,00%	2,32%	0,00%	0,10%	0,00%
GURKOVO	75,27%	40,28%	35,12%	19,37%	0,60%	0,49%
HADZHIDIMOVO	9,08%	5,94%	3,97%	3,00%	0,15%	0,15%
HARMANLI	14,71%	10,90%	6,15%	4,40%	0,56%	0,64%
HASKOVO	11,44%	5,58%	6,05%	3,22%	1,87%	1,40%
HAYREDIN	59,23%	56,15%	26,68%	25,54%	0,43%	0,62%
HISARYA	3,25%	3,25%	0,71%	0,71%	0,06%	0,09%
HITRINO	44,29%	37,52%	28,05%	23,79%	0,59%	0,77%
IHTIMAN	38,28%	33,03%	23,41%	21,98%	1,11%	1,48%
ISKAR	8,62%	8,62%	4,61%	4,61%	0,07%	0,10%
ISPERIH	40,35%	24,46%	21,48%	12,82%	1,88%	1,75%
IVANOVO	22,53%	8,13%	7,92%	3,44%	0,34%	0,19%
IVAYLOVGRAD	6,52%	6,52%	4,78%	4,78%	0,09%	0,14%
KALOYANOVO	26,92%	20,57%	9,76%	7,78%	0,45%	0,53%
KAMENO	13,27%	11,63%	4,29%	3,99%	0,18%	0,25%
KAOLINOVO	15,54%	15,54%	11,30%	11,30%	0,44%	0,68%
KARDZHALI	11,95%	7,36%	7,26%	5,13%	1,55%	1,47%
KARLOVO	9,32%	5,78%	4,41%	3,29%	0,65%	0,62%
KARNOBAT	12,80%	6,57%	5,04%	2,18%	0,41%	0,32%
KASPICHAN	30,90%	14,43%	13,45%	6,21%	0,31%	0,22%
KAVARNA	8,45%	7,47%	2,87%	2,51%	0,16%	0,21%
KAYNARDZHA	37,24%	23,53%	22,60%	12,94%	0,27%	0,26%
KAZANLAK	7,67%	5,37%	3,04%	1,69%	0,96%	1,03%
KIRKOVO	20,11%	9,23%	11,65%	5,22%	1,05%	0,74%
KNEZHA	16,96%	16,96%	7,62%	7,62%	0,31%	0,47%
KOCHERINOVO	13,44%	6,72%	4,75%	2,63%	0,10%	0,07%
KOPRIVSHTITSA	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
KOSTENETS	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
KOSTINBROD	5,04%	0,00%	2,03%	0,00%	0,16%	0,00%
KOTEL	37,07%	24,30%	21,25%	13,40%	0,94%	0,95%
KOVATCHEVTSI	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
KOZLODUY	16,63%	10,15%	6,12%	3,98%	0,50%	0,47%
KRESNA	14,12%	2,98%	6,78%	2,11%	0,16%	0,05%
KRICHIM	21,46%	17,13%	8,20%	6,80%	0,20%	0,24%
KRIVODOL	33,15%	27,33%	11,82%	10,05%	0,41%	0,52%
KRUMOVGRAD	11,97%	6,47%	8,43%	4,94%	0,61%	0,50%
KRUSHARI	11,83%	11,83%	7,51%	7,51%	0,09%	0,14%
KUBRAT	7,71%	3,80%	4,67%	1,56%	0,24%	0,18%

KUKLEN	10,00%	0,00%	4,43%	0,00%	0,11%	0,00%
KULA	9,00%	0,00%	3,35%	0,00%	0,06%	0,00%
KYUSTENDIL	3,53%	0,19%	1,21%	0,07%	0,34%	0,03%
LAKI	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
LESICHOVO	14,17%	14,17%	12,04%	12,04%	0,12%	0,18%
LETNITSA	8,23%	0,00%	2,51%	0,00%	0,04%	0,00%
LEVSKI	18,95%	12,59%	6,21%	4,44%	0,46%	0,47%
LOM	31,99%	27,86%	16,68%	14,46%	1,43%	1,92%
LOVECH	14,21%	11,49%	4,64%	3,84%	1,13%	1,40%
LOZNITSA	17,97%	17,97%	10,58%	10,58%	0,37%	0,56%
LUKOVIT	35,32%	17,36%	16,55%	9,65%	0,76%	0,57%
LYASKOVETS	17,62%	12,24%	4,51%	3,00%	0,33%	0,36%
LYUBIMETS	5,56%	1,58%	3,60%	1,01%	0,10%	0,04%
MADAN	19,67%	3,16%	10,24%	2,38%	0,56%	0,14%
MADZHAROVO	1,36%	1,36%	0,68%	0,68%	0,01%	0,01%
MAGLIZH	25,61%	21,87%	12,77%	11,57%	0,35%	0,46%
MAKRESH	33,40%	33,40%	11,50%	11,50%	0,09%	0,14%
MALKO TARNOVO	12,58%	0,00%	2,76%	0,00%	0,06%	0,00%
MARITSA	7,29%	4,76%	2,61%	1,68%	0,30%	0,31%
MEDKOVETS	52,84%	37,28%	17,07%	12,65%	0,36%	0,39%
MEZDRA	9,87%	5,94%	4,14%	2,27%	0,34%	0,31%
MINERALNI BANI	7,54%	2,23%	4,38%	0,81%	0,13%	0,06%
MIRKOVO	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
MIZIYA	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
MOMCHILGRAD	6,82%	3,56%	5,52%	2,75%	0,28%	0,23%
MONTANA	9,51%	5,79%	3,51%	2,49%	0,88%	0,82%
NEDELINO	24,38%	17,12%	10,03%	7,20%	0,22%	0,24%
NESEBAR	3,21%	3,21%	0,80%	0,80%	0,12%	0,19%
NEVESTINO	8,62%	0,00%	2,53%	0,00%	0,04%	0,00%
NIKOLA KOZLEVO	12,24%	5,06%	5,70%	2,47%	0,16%	0,10%
NIKOLAEVO	26,42%	9,91%	15,77%	5,78%	0,17%	0,10%
NIKOPOL	14,33%	8,45%	6,21%	3,68%	0,22%	0,20%
NOVA ZAGORA	10,67%	7,71%	6,34%	4,81%	0,50%	0,55%
NOVI PAZAR	7,06%	7,06%	3,39%	3,39%	0,18%	0,27%
NOVO SELO	31,38%	17,28%	7,35%	3,38%	0,16%	0,14%
OMURTAG	24,96%	13,61%	17,45%	9,45%	0,98%	0,82%
OPAKA	15,66%	0,00%	9,76%	0,00%	0,19%	0,00%
OPAN	10,72%	10,72%	2,00%	2,00%	0,06%	0,09%
ORYAHOVO	5,42%	1,77%	1,94%	0,83%	0,08%	0,04%
PANAGYURISHTE	2,29%	2,29%	1,12%	1,12%	0,08%	0,13%
PARVOMAY	9,33%	2,68%	3,17%	0,91%	0,31%	0,14%
PAVEL BANYA	9,10%	6,00%	4,63%	2,82%	0,22%	0,22%
PAVLIKENI	19,54%	9,12%	7,95%	5,02%	0,63%	0,45%
PAZARDZHIK	12,85%	8,85%	6,21%	4,82%	2,12%	2,24%

PERNIK	2,90%	2,45%	0,93%	0,73%	0,45%	0,59%
PERUSHITSA	10,77%	10,77%	5,26%	5,26%	0,07%	0,10%
PESHTERA	13,73%	5,92%	5,28%	1,48%	0,34%	0,23%
PETRICH	3,31%	1,87%	1,91%	1,12%	0,28%	0,24%
PIRDOP	7,85%	7,85%	1,85%	1,85%	0,10%	0,15%
PLEVEN	7,33%	5,07%	3,05%	2,57%	1,58%	1,68%
PLOVDIV	3,18%	2,19%	1,62%	1,23%	1,96%	2,07%
POLSKI TRAMBESH	26,76%	22,76%	11,44%	10,36%	0,50%	0,66%
POMORIE	5,19%	1,76%	3,10%	1,11%	0,22%	0,11%
POPOVO	29,27%	26,27%	10,87%	9,82%	0,99%	1,36%
PORDIM	27,40%	12,88%	11,71%	5,76%	0,22%	0,16%
PRAVETS	25,46%	13,43%	8,54%	5,69%	0,35%	0,28%
PRIMORSKO	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
PROVADIYA	19,20%	15,29%	9,14%	7,76%	0,59%	0,72%
RADNEVO	12,74%	8,52%	4,18%	2,24%	0,35%	0,36%
RADOMIR	4,69%	0,93%	1,65%	0,41%	0,14%	0,04%
RAKITOVO	32,01%	17,74%	17,84%	11,01%	0,67%	0,57%
RAKOVSKI	4,89%	2,43%	2,15%	1,11%	0,15%	0,11%
RAZGRAD	10,38%	7,93%	5,59%	4,65%	0,79%	0,93%
RAZLOG	16,33%	16,33%	9,31%	9,31%	0,69%	1,06%
RILA	30,54%	8,51%	8,74%	2,68%	0,14%	0,06%
RODOPI	7,43%	5,85%	2,91%	2,19%	0,37%	0,45%
ROMAN	24,70%	11,24%	7,07%	3,25%	0,25%	0,17%
RUDOZEM	25,66%	8,73%	11,96%	4,52%	0,51%	0,27%
RUEN	5,08%	3,41%	3,90%	2,87%	0,36%	0,37%
RUSE	2,53%	1,06%	0,91%	0,52%	0,66%	0,42%
RUZHINTSI	45,05%	22,97%	20,43%	10,66%	0,37%	0,29%
SADOVO	22,23%	11,72%	10,57%	6,67%	0,38%	0,31%
SAEDINENIE	1,08%	0,00%	0,35%	0,00%	0,01%	0,00%
SAMOKOV	6,81%	1,56%	4,27%	0,64%	0,44%	0,16%
SAMUIL	18,61%	13,69%	14,34%	11,56%	0,33%	0,37%
SANDANSKI	4,18%	0,88%	1,19%	0,30%	0,28%	0,09%
SAPAREVA BANYA	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
SARNITSA	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
SATOVCHA	12,13%	8,44%	8,44%	6,38%	0,39%	0,42%
SEPTEMVRI	16,72%	11,68%	12,45%	7,58%	0,68%	0,73%
SEVLIEVO	10,56%	7,46%	4,45%	3,65%	0,58%	0,63%
SHABLA	8,22%	0,00%	3,14%	0,00%	0,06%	0,00%
SHUMEN	5,21%	4,61%	2,13%	1,95%	0,77%	1,04%
SILISTRA	5,30%	4,16%	2,29%	1,97%	0,48%	0,58%
SIMEONOVGRAD	3,85%	0,00%	1,97%	0,00%	0,05%	0,00%
SIMITLI	8,42%	2,71%	7,24%	2,33%	0,32%	0,16%
SITOVO	18,73%	18,73%	11,83%	11,83%	0,19%	0,29%
SLIVEN	9,62%	4,88%	4,17%	2,06%	1,58%	1,23%

SLIVNITSA	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
SLIVO POLE	20,69%	11,96%	8,50%	6,63%	0,29%	0,25%
SMOLYAN	10,29%	9,25%	3,25%	2,91%	0,68%	0,94%
SMYADOVO	17,31%	13,59%	8,02%	7,03%	0,13%	0,16%
SOFIA	0,64%	0,27%	0,23%	0,11%	1,68%	1,08%
SOPOT	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
SOZOPOL	18,68%	18,68%	7,28%	7,28%	0,45%	0,68%
SREDETS	13,05%	10,23%	5,22%	3,83%	0,24%	0,29%
STAMBOLIYSKI	7,10%	7,10%	4,30%	4,30%	0,19%	0,29%
STAMBOLOVO	9,08%	2,29%	5,36%	0,43%	0,21%	0,08%
STARAZAGORA	4,84%	3,46%	2,01%	1,61%	1,39%	1,52%
STRALDZHA	21,57%	18,85%	9,01%	8,03%	0,32%	0,43%
STRAZHITSA	32,75%	32,75%	17,16%	17,16%	0,57%	0,87%
STRELCHA	3,29%	3,29%	1,67%	1,67%	0,03%	0,04%
STRUMYANI	22,37%	2,49%	8,10%	1,04%	0,14%	0,02%
SUHINDOL	21,79%	14,34%	8,66%	6,36%	0,08%	0,08%
SUNGURLARE	38,61%	25,81%	22,89%	13,53%	0,68%	0,70%
SUVOROVO	3,20%	3,20%	2,25%	2,25%	0,04%	0,06%
SVILENGRAD	11,49%	5,96%	4,83%	2,60%	0,46%	0,36%
SVISHTOV	10,77%	4,65%	2,91%	1,22%	0,52%	0,35%
SVOGE	25,58%	19,05%	7,96%	6,04%	0,83%	0,95%
TARGOVISHTE	15,19%	13,12%	9,53%	8,26%	1,65%	2,19%
TERVEL	37,87%	20,76%	23,02%	13,63%	0,94%	0,79%
TETEVEN	47,63%	40,20%	21,30%	18,00%	1,64%	2,12%
TOPOLOVGRAD	10,95%	6,55%	3,50%	1,83%	0,18%	0,16%
TRAN	6,42%	6,42%	2,99%	2,99%	0,04%	0,07%
TREKLYANO	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
TROYAN	4,64%	2,63%	1,81%	1,16%	0,23%	0,20%
TRYAVNA	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
TSAR KALOYAN	8,30%	0,00%	7,29%	0,00%	0,08%	0,00%
TSAREVO	8,77%	8,77%	3,96%	3,96%	0,14%	0,21%
TSENOVO	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
TUNDZHA	14,69%	7,16%	4,70%	2,70%	0,47%	0,35%
TUTRAKAN	12,11%	8,42%	5,44%	4,65%	0,33%	0,35%
TVARDITSA	12,07%	4,33%	6,29%	2,24%	0,18%	0,10%
UGARCHIN	13,66%	7,77%	5,76%	3,45%	0,11%	0,10%
VALCHEDRAM	37,06%	25,39%	22,48%	16,41%	0,59%	0,62%
VALCHI DOL	26,15%	18,13%	11,56%	7,85%	0,39%	0,42%
VARBITSA	16,09%	0,00%	11,82%	0,00%	0,34%	0,00%
VARNA	1,98%	1,57%	0,94%	0,74%	1,27%	1,54%
VARSHETS	11,07%	0,00%	7,89%	0,00%	0,15%	0,00%
VELIKI PRESLAV	15,15%	11,73%	5,90%	3,77%	0,25%	0,30%
VELIKO TARNOVO	3,01%	1,50%	1,43%	0,69%	0,46%	0,35%
VELINGRAD	22,12%	18,80%	13,83%	11,39%	1,26%	1,64%

VENETS	16,89%	8,20%	11,75%	6,19%	0,30%	0,22%
VETOVO	28,31%	6,47%	17,00%	4,49%	0,54%	0,19%
VETRINO	6,15%	0,00%	2,36%	0,00%	0,06%	0,00%
VIDIN	11,43%	7,83%	4,58%	3,54%	1,01%	1,07%
VRATSA	2,50%	1,73%	1,13%	0,80%	0,30%	0,32%
YABLANITSA	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
YAKIMOVO	66,90%	30,24%	32,83%	13,47%	0,39%	0,27%
YAKORUDA	25,94%	12,57%	18,44%	7,89%	0,48%	0,35%
YAMBOL	2,34%	1,86%	1,01%	0,76%	0,24%	0,30%
ZAVET	10,33%	10,33%	6,56%	6,56%	0,20%	0,30%
ZEMEN	7,28%	7,28%	3,35%	3,35%	0,04%	0,06%
ZLATARITSA	44,44%	36,21%	19,19%	16,78%	0,30%	0,37%
ZLATITSA	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
ZLATOGRAD	31,70%	27,08%	10,36%	9,04%	0,62%	0,81%

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The Anti-Corruption Fund is an independent, expert-led non-governmental organization, which investigates cases of alleged corruption, misuse of public funds, and conflict of interest among public officials in Bulgaria. Our research adheres to the highest legal, professional, and ethical standards. We aim to assist public authorities and journalists in investigating and prosecuting corruption-related violations. The goal of our work is to help address systemic factors leading to high corruption levels, and to raise public awareness about the existing mechanisms to counteract corruption.

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