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ELECTION FRAUD:
PREVALENCE AND IMPACT IN BULGARIA



Parliamentary Election, November 2021

ANTI CORRUPTION FUND

This analysis was published with the financial contribution of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Rule of Law – South East Europe Programme. The content of this publication represents exclusive responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and its Rule of Law – South East Europe Programme.

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More than 30 years after the start of the transition to democracy and a market economy, Bulgaria still faces challenges in building both effective and democratic institutions and trust in the political system. Having achieved moderate progress in economic development, Bulgaria's 44th National Assembly and the last regular government both saw record low levels of trust. In this context, the transparency and fairness of elections remains a yet unresolved challenge of the Bulgarian transition period. The main concerns arise from suspicions of controlled and purchased vote, as well as frequent and controversial changes in electoral law.

This is why the issue of controlled and purchased votes remains central to a number of academic and journalistic investigations and analyses by polling agencies. In order to raise and deepen the debate on the issue among civil society and to empower law enforcement and also law enforcement bodies, the Anti-Corruption Fund has developed a methodology to identify polling stations where the risk of controlled and purchased vote is high. This methodology enables the Bulgarian authorities to direct their efforts to counter controlled and purchased voting to the polling stations that present a higher risk. It allows to give a clearer picture of the potential size of the controlled and purchased vote to emerge and enables its tracking and evolution in election years.

Main conclusions of the analysis

- The tendency for polling stations at risk to register a more pronounced decline in turnout compared to other polling stations recorded in the July 2021 parliamentary elections has persisted. In places, this trend is easier to observe, but there are provinces and municipalities that show deviations from the overall picture.
- The biggest drop in the turnout at polling stations at risk was registered in the electoral districts (ED) of **Stara Zagora, Varna, Burgas** and **Sliven**.
- In ED13 **Pazardzhik** the turnout at polling stations at risk increased.
- In the municipalities of **Velingrad, Levski** and **Valchedram**, activity at polling stations also increased.
- In the municipalities of **Burgas** and **Ruse**, the decline in turnout at polling sections at risk was significantly more pronounced than the average decline in turnout in the municipality.
- In other municipalities, where the share of potential purchased and controlled votes is significant, such as **Kotel, Tervel, Hitrino, Kirkovo** and **Sungulare**, the turnout at polling stations at risk dropped by a percentage in keeping with the average decline in the municipality.
- The percentage of municipalities where the share of potentially purchased or controlled votes from the total vote in the municipality is below 1% increased significantly.
- The **Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) Party** retained the lead in the proportion of votes received in polling stations at risk, with a relatively small loss in polling stations at risk compared to the July election. The political party **Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)** remains in second place on the basis of this indicator, but recorded significant losses at polling stations at risk. The **Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)**, the **We Continue the Change party,** and **Democratic Bulgaria** coalition come in next on the basis of this indicator of their share of votes at risk.
- **DPS, the National Union of the Right, and the BSP** are at the top in terms of share of votes for the party cast in at-risk polling stations. **GERB, There is Such a People (ITN) and We Continue the Change Party** have lower percentages on the basis of this indicator.
- In 15 localities, the share of votes cast in mobile ballot boxes is over 25 %, indicating a potentially new mechanism for controlling the vote. However, the effect of such schemes on the results of the parliamentary elections is marginal.

Based on the results of the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria held over the last 8 years , the Anti-Corruption Fund has identified the polling stations where the risk of vote purchasing and manipulation is higher. The polling stations at risk were identified using three models:

- A model of multicomponent abnormal behavior. It identifies polling stations that have (1) an atypically high turnout in a particular polling station compared to the recorded turnout in the municipality, or (2) an extreme high result of the leading political party in the polling station compared to the recorded result of the party in the municipality, and (3) an extreme high number of invalid ballots and votes in the polling station. After the introduction of compulsory machine voting, the indicator of an extreme high number of invalid ballots and votes was removed from the model as machine voting eliminates any invalid ballots.
- The second model identifies variation in the turnout in a given polling station in two consecutive election years after accounting for the average change in turnout at the municipality level. It is based on the hypothesis that in the absence of controlled and purchased votes in the high-risk polling station in a given election year, the turnout in the same polling station drops sharply.
- The third model accounts an abrupt change in the political leanings of the voters in a given polling station in two consecutive election years - a sharp increase or decrease in votes for a given political party in the polling station after accounting for overall changes in the political leanings of voters at municipal level.

Based on the analysis of all parliamentary elections between 2013 and July 2021, **1,738** polling stations were identified where **deviations in election results were observed at least twice.**

The first part of this analysis examines how citizens voted in the Parliamentary elections (PE) in Bulgaria held on November 14, 2021 in these 1,738 polling stations. Election results from these high-risk polling stations at the November 2021 PE are compared with those from the PE held in July 2021.

The second part presents the results of the application of the methodology for identifying the risk of vote purchasing and manipulation on the results of the parliamentary elections held in November 2021. It presents information on which polling stations showed deviations in the last parliamentary elections.

The methodology for identifying the risk of vote purchasing and control does not apply to mobile polling stations where comparisons cannot be made within two consecutive elections. Therefore, **the third part** of this report focuses on the variations in voting patterns in mobile polling stations that are observed in some localities.

Part 1
How did the polling stations considered at risk of vote purchasing and manipulation in previous parliamentary elections vote in the PE in November 2021?

At the Parliamentary elections in November 2021, 265 more sections were opened compared to the elections in July, or a total of 12,488 sections. 37 of them did not correspond to those of July 2021PE based on the Unified Classifier of Administrative-Territorial and Territorial Units (UCATTU) and address. 521 mobile sections were included in the calculation of the results at the municipal level but were not included in the risk analysis. 775 small sections with less than 60 registered voters were also not included in the risk analysis. In 253 sections, matching UCATTU and address, the number of registered voters in the sections differed in the two elections by more than 30% and were not considered in the risk analysis.

Total number of votes and number of votes for the winner in the polling stations

As noted in the previous analyses of the April and July 2021 parliamentary elections, it is difficult to estimate what part of the votes cast in polling stations at risk are under threat of vote purchasing/manipulation. For this reason, the portion of purchased and manipulated votes was calculated based on the total number of voters in all polling stations at risk, as well as on the basis of the votes for the winning parties in those polling stations.

In the **1,738** polling stations that were identified as being at risk of a bought and controlled vote in previous parliamentary elections, **199,762** citizens (**8.2%** of votes cast) voted in the November 2021 at the PE. Compared to voting at these 1,738 PE polling stations in July 2021, the number of votes cast at at-risk polling stations fell by **22,713** votes, a **10.2%** decline in the turnout from July. At the same time, the turnout at the PE in November 2021 was down with **6.2%** compared to the July PE. This means that the decline in the turnout at high-risk polling stations was **4** points higher than the total, equating to **8,934** votes. In the July 2021 PE, **disproportionately lower voter turnout** was also reported in the at-risk polling stations than the average turnout for the country, and this observation was more pronounced than in the last parliamentary elections in November 2021. In July, the reasons for this higher decline in at-risk stations were sought both in the greater labor mobility during the summer months of the population vulnerable to vote purchasing and manipulation, and in the active actions of the Ministry of Interior to combat crime related to the voting rights of the citizens, as well as with the introduced mass machine voting in Bulgaria. Prior to the parliamentary elections in November 2021, the Ministry of Interior also conducted a number of actions against the purchased and controlled vote. As some of the at-risk stations are in areas with a concentration of low literate population, the introduction of compulsory machine voting can also be defined as a factor for the low turnout in these polling stations.

A more pronounced decline in the vote activity (**11.5%**) was also reported in the votes cast for the winning party in the stations at risk - **102,338** (**4.2%** of the votes cast).

Dimensions of vote purchasing and manipulation by electoral districts

The tendency for at-risk polling stations to record a disproportionately lower turnout than the national average is not evident across the country. The biggest decline in turnout in the at-risk polling stations was observed in the **Stara Zagora Electoral district (ED)**, where the decline in the at-risk polling stations was **19.2%** compared to the average decrease of the turnout in the region of **11.1%**. In electoral district **Varna** the turnout in the at-risk polling stations also decreased by twice the percentage of the other polling stations in the region. In **Burgas and Sliven ED** there is also a disproportionately lower turnout in the at-risk polling stations compared to the average turnout in these regions.

At the same time, in electoral district **Pazardzhik** the turnout in the at-risk polling stations increased by **11.7%**, while the turnout in the region decreased by **6.7%**. In **Plovdiv-city ED**, a region where a record low turnout was recorded in the at-risk polling stations in the July 2021 PE, the turnout increased again in November 2021 by **8.4%** with a decline in turnout in the region. In the **25th ED Sofia**, where in the July 2021 elections the turnout in the at-risk polling stations was also significantly lower, in November 2021 the decrease was very small (**3%**). Such regional differences can be linked to the greater effectiveness of institutional action against controlled and purchased voting in some localities. Another explanation can be found in the decreased incentive of political actors to resort to this mechanism to ensure votes, in view of the series of three consecutive parliamentary elections held in a short period of time, and also in the short horizon of the National Assemblies formed, as well as the expenditures invested already for vote manipulation.

Dimensions of vote purchasing and manipulation by municipalities

At the municipal level, these differences persist, with some municipalities exhibiting a slight increase in the number of votes cast in polling stations at risk. In the municipality of **Velingrad**, for example, the number of votes cast in at-risk polling stations increased by **183** (**8.4%**), while the average turnout in the municipality decreased compared to July. The town of **Levski** also saw an increase (**64 votes**) with an average decrease in turnout in the municipality compared to July of **10.6%**. In **Valchedram**, the turnout in the at-risk polling stations also increased, raising the share of votes at risk in the total number of votes cast in the municipality from **40.6%** to **46.1%**. In the municipality of **Burgas, 210** fewer votes were cast in at-risk polling stations (**16.3%** decrease compared to July), with an average decrease in turnout in the municipality **of 5.5%**. In the municipality of **Ruse**, where the Ministry of Interior carried out operations against vote purchasing, **414** fewer votes were cast in the polling stations at risk, or a **21.8%** decrease in turnout compared to an average decline in the turnout in the municipality of **4.8%**. At the same time, in other municipalities where the share of potential purchased and controlled votes is significant, such as **Kotel, Tervel, Hitrino, Kirkovo and Sungulare**, the voter turnout in high-risk polling stations decreased by a percentage similar to the average decline in the municipality.

Vote at risk by political parties

Figure 1 shows the distribution of at-risk polling stations by parties in the Parliamentary elections in July and in November 2021. In the PE held in November 2021, the political parties **GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria)** and **MRF (Movement for rights and freedoms)** continue to win a significant part of the votes cast in the polling stations at risk, with **37.7%** of all votes cast in these polling stations going to the MRF and **21%** going to **GERB**. Compared to the July 2021 PE **MRF** continues to increase its share of votes in at-risk polling stations and **GERB** continues to lose them.

The newly formed Political Party **"We Continue the Change"** ("Prodalzhavame promyanata") takes **10%** of the vote in the at-risk sections. The share of the vote in the polling sections at risk of the **BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party), There is Such a People party** ("Ima Takav Narod"; ITN)**,** and **Democratic Bulgaria coalition (DB)** is decreasing.

In the July 2021 PE, **GERB** lost over **46%** of its support in at-risk polling sections, or nearly **41,000** of the votes at risk. In the November 2021 elections, this trend continues. While the average decrease in the support for **GERB** in the country is **7.7%**, in at-risk stations they lose **21.9%** or over **11,000 votes.**

The biggest loser in terms of absolute number of votes in at-risk sections is the **There is Such a People Party (17 651 votes**). Taking into account the sharp decline of the support for this political party in the country (**62.3%**), however, it lost a lower share of its votes in at-risk polling stations than expected (**58.1%**). In the same situation are other parties whose support nationwide is decreasing – **BSP, Democratic Bulgaria** and **Rise Up BG! We Are Coming!** ("Izpravi se BG! Nie idvame!", **IBGNI**). **Democratic Bulgaria's** loss in the polling stations at risk is **43.9%** against their overall decrease of votes received of **52.3%**. **BSP** lost **24.4%** of their votes in at-risk polling sections, but on a national average the party registered a decrease of their support of **27%**.

After the reduction in the absolute number of votes in at-risk polling sections that the **MRF** recorded in the July 2021 PE, in November the party lost votes in at-risk polling stations by a percentage that is commensurate with that at the national level. Across all polling sections in the country, the **MRF** lost an average of **16%** of votes cast in July. In at-risk polling stations, this percentage was even higher – over **20%.**

Compared to July 2021, in the November PE the political party **Renaissance** ("Vazrazhdane") won **115%** more votes in the at-risk polling stations, while the average increase in support for this party was **59%**. However, the party's share of votes received in at-risk polling stations remains minimal at **2.4%**.

The greatest weight of votes from polling stations at risk continues to be seen in the results of the **Movement for Rights and Freedoms party – 29.1%** of all votes for party came from polling stations at risk. **The National Rally of the Right coalition** came second with **16.3%** of their votes cast polling stations at risk. (see **Figure 2**).

Figure 1 Distribution of votes in polling stations at risk by political party (high outlier threshold), PE2021 July and PE2021 November



Figure 2 Distribution of the votes for political parties cast in polling stations at risk (in at least two PE, 2013-2021), PE2021 July and PE2021 November



Part 2
Which polling stations showed deviations in the parliamentary elections in November 2021?

Number of polling stations at higher risk of controlled and purchased

The introduction of machine voting solved the problem of the high number of invalid ballots and votes, which was one of the indicators of the first model for determining the polling stations where there is a higher risk of controlled and purchased votes. When taking into account the extreme high turnout rates and the lead party's result compared to the turnout and its result in the municipality only **45** polling stations showed deviations.

An unusually high turnout difference between the July and November 2021 parliamentary elections was recorded in **26** polling stations (using a high threshold for determining outliers) – see **Table 2**. The result jumps to **36** polling stations when using a low threshold to determine extreme values – see **Table 1**.

In the application of the third model for determining at-risk polling stations, abrupt changes in the political bias with five political parties are sought – GERB, MRF, BSP, "There is such a people party" and Democratic Bulgaria. The same thresholds were applied to determine an extreme value for a party's difference in the result at the July and November elections. It should be borne in mind that despite the proximity in time of the two consecutive parliamentary elections, the political situation was extremely dynamic, with the emergence of a new strong political player, the PP "We Continue the Change". Although the methodology takes into account the overall change in political bias at the municipal level, it should be considered that the reasons for the deviations in some sections may not be related to a controlled and manipulated vote.

When this model was applied to the November 2021 parliamentary elections, there was an abrupt change in the political bias of voters in **572** polling stations (usinga high outlier threshold) to **849** polling stations (using a low outlier threshold) (see **Tables 1** and **2**).

Table 1 Applying the models for identifying polling stations at risk (low outlier threshold)

	Multi-component abnormal behavior	Deviations in voter turnout (low outlier threshold)	Volatility (low outlier threshold)	Total polling stations	Proportion of stations at risk %	Votes (low outlier threshold)	Proportion of votes %
PE July 2021	52	163	1474	1780	14.6	250 314	9.6
PE November 2021	45	36	849	913	7.3	129 357	5.3

Table 2 Applying the models for identifying polling stations at risk (high outlier threshold)

	Multi-component abnormal behavior	Deviations in voter turnout (high outlier threshold)	Volatility (high outlier threshold)	Total polling stations	Proportion of stations at risk %	Votes (high outlier threshold)	Proportion of votes %
PE July 2021	52	109	1052	1378	11.3	183 676	7.1
PE November 2021	45	26	572	629	5.0	89 891	3.7

The share of at-risk stations in 2021 varies between **5.0%** (high outlier threshold) and **7.3%** (low outlier threshold) of the total number of stations. Compared to the July 2021 PE, in November there were significantly fewer stations with deviations (749 fewer when using the high outlier threshold) or a 56% reduction in the absolute number of stations where a high risk of a purchased and controlled vote has been identified.

100% of the polling stations that the models identified as ''at risk'' in November 2021 were also identified as ''at risk'' based on the results of PE 2013, PE 2014, PE 2017 and PE 2021, April and PE 2021, July.

Total number of votes and number of votes for the winner in the polling stations

When the models that use a low outlier threshold are applied, the number of votes cast in polling stations at risk in the November 2021 PE amounts to **129,357**. When the high outlier threshold models are applied, the number amounts to **183,676** voters. This corresponds to **5,3%** and **3,7%** of all the votes cast in the country, respectively.

In comparison with the July 2021 PE, the votes cast in polling stations exhibiting deviations in the November 2021 PE was **93,785** fewer, which translates to an overall decline of **51%** in absolute number of votes.[1] As a share of the total number of votes cast in the country, the percentage has declined from **11.3%** to **5%**.

If it is assumed that the majority of purchased votes were cast for the winner in each respective polling station, then the number of votes at risk ranges between **44,313 to 62,215.** This amounts to **1,8%** to **2,5%** of all the votes cast in the country.

Compared to the parliamentary elections in July 2021, the number of votes cast for the winners in the polling stations with deviations in the November 2021 PE is **42,188** less than those in the stations with deviations in July, which is a **48%** reduction in the absolute number. The share of votes for the winner of the total number of voters declined[2] from **3.3%** to **1.8%**.

1 High outlier threshold
2 High outlier threshold

Dimensions of vote purchasing and manipulation by electoral district

The dimensions of vote purchasing and manipulation determined with reference to all applied indicators – number of at-risk polling stations, votes cast in at-risk polling stations, and votes cast for the winner in at-risk polling stations – varies significantly by region (see **Figure 3**). At the July 2021 PE, the **Lovech** electoral district was the leader in terms of the share of votes cast in deviating polling stations, while the **Kardzhali** electoral district led in terms of votes for the winner cast in deviating polling stations.

At the November 2021 PE, the **Kardzhali** electoral district remains the leader in terms of votes for the winner cast in at-risk polling stations (see **Table 3**). The **Montana** electoral district comes out on top in terms of share of votes cast in polling station with a deviation of **14.7%**[3]. **Montana**'s district also had a noticeable weight in the July election (**13.5 to 19.2%**). In addition to the Montana region, a higher weight of potentially purchased votes compared to the votes in the region was also in the district of **Pazardzhik (10.0 to 14.1%), Targovishte (10.0 to 13.7%), Pleven (9.1 to 11.2%)** and **Kardzhali (7.3% to 11.2%).**

The lowest proportion of purchased and manipulated votes was identified in the **25th ED – Sofia (0.0% to 0.2%),** followed by **Pernik (0,4 %to 0,7%), 23rd ED – Sofia (0.5% to 0.8%), Plovdiv City ED (0.8% to 0.9%),** the **24th ED – Sofia (0.8% to 1%) –** See **Table 3.**

In terms of the share of the total number of votes at risk in the November 2021 PE, the **ED Pazardzhik (8.7%)** and the **ED Veliko Tarnovo (7.1%)** are in the lead[4]. Compared to July 2021, in November the **Veliko Tarnovo** electoral district increases this share from **3.9% to 7.1%**. The **Burgas** electoral district continues to fall behind in this indicator, with a decrease from **5.5%** in July to **4.6%** in November. At the same time, the share of the total number of votes at risk in **Varna electoral district** increased from **5.6% to 6.1%**.

3 Low outlier threshold
4 High outlier thresholdr

Table 3 Dimensions of the potentially purchased and manipulated votes by electoral district, PE2021 November

Electoral District	Votes cast in polling stations at risk within the district (%, low outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk within the district (%, high outlier threshold)	Votes for the winner in polling stations at risk (%, low outlier threshold)	Votes for the winner in polling stations at risk (%, high outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk out of all votes at risk (%, low outlier threshold)	otes cast in polling stations at risk out of all votes at risk (%, high outlier threshold)
01. BLAGOEVGRAD	6.2%	3.5%	3.6%	1.9%	5.6%	4.5%
02. BURGAS	3.9%	2.9%	2.6%	1.9%	4.3%	4.6%
03. VARNA	4.8%	3.4%	2.1%	1.6%	5.9%	6.1%
04. VELIKO TARNOVO	10.7%	8.1%	4.3%	3.6%	6.5%	7.1%
05. VIDIN	6.4%	2.0%	2.5%	1.1%	1.4%	0.7%
06. VRATSA	10.0%	7.1%	3.9%	2.9%	4.5%	4.6%
07. GABROVO	1.9%	1.4%	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%
08. DOBRICH	6.8%	5.1%	3.2%	2.5%	2.8%	3.0%
09. KARDZHALI	11.2%	7.3%	**8.2%**	**5.7%**	5.8%	5.4%
10. KYUSTENDIL	1.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.2%	0.5%	0.3%
11. LOVECH	10.1%	6.7%	4.3%	3.1%	3.3%	3.1%
12. MONTANA	**14.7%**	**11.2%**	6.9%	5.3%	5.1%	5.6%
13. PAZARDZHIK	14.1%	10.0%	6.8%	5.1%	**8.5%**	**8.7%**
14. PERNIK	0.7%	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
15. PLEVEN	11.2%	9.1%	3.9%	3.3%	7.1%	8.3%
16. PLOVDIV city	0.9%	0.8%	0.5%	0.4%	0.8%	1.0%
17. PLOVDIV region	4.5%	1.6%	2.0%	0.7%	3.4%	1.8%
18. RAZGRAD	8.3%	5.0%	4.9%	3.0%	2.7%	2.3%
19. RUSE	3.5%	2.8%	1.6%	1.4%	1.9%	2.3%
20. SILISTRA	9.6%	6.9%	6.5%	4.7%	3.2%	3.3%
21. SLIVEN	7.4%	3.9%	3.4%	2.0%	2.9%	2.2%
22. SMOLYAN	6.4%	3.5%	3.4%	1.8%	2.1%	1.6%
23. SOFIA 23 MED	0.8%	0.5%	0.2%	0.1%	1.3%	1.2%
24. SOFIA 24 MED	1.0%	0.8%	0.2%	0.2%	1.1%	1.4%
25. SOFIA 25 MED	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%
26. SOFIA region	6.5%	5.1%	2.8%	2.3%	3.8%	4.3%
27. STARA ZAGORA	4.4%	3.7%	1.8%	1.6%	3.6%	4.4%
28. TARGOVISHTE	13.7%	10.0%	7.3%	5.9%	4.0%	4.2%
29. HASKOVO	5.9%	3.8%	2.8%	1.8%	3.8%	3.5%
30. SHUMEN	5.8%	5.1%	2.9%	2.4%	2.6%	3.2%
31. YAMBOL	1.7%	1.1%	0.5%	0.3%	0.5%	0.4%

Figure 3 Dimensions of the potentially purchased and manipulated votes by electoral district, PE2021 November



Dimensions of vote purchasing and manipulation by municipality

Compared to the PE in July 2021, at the PE in November 2021 there has been a significant increase in the percentage of municipalities where the share of the total vote in the municipality that is potentially purchased or controlled is less than **1%** (see **Figure 4**). From **36** municipalities in July (**13.6%** of the municipalities in the country), in November they became **101** (**38.3%** of the municipalities in the country) - see **Figure 5**)[5]. In about **23.5%** of the municipalities (**62** municipalities) this percentage varies between **1%** and **5%**. In **54** municipalities (**20.5%** of the municipalities in the country), the proportion of votes at risk accounts for between 10-25% of the vote in the municipality. The share of potentially purchased and controlled vote is significant (over 25%) in **8** of the municipalities compared to **21** municipalities in the July 2021 PE. Concentration of polling stations with deviations is seen in the districts of **Rakitovo, Levski, Knezha, Polski Trambesh, Strazhitsa** and **Kaynardzha.** In **Dolni Chiflik, Valchi Dol, Vetrino, Valchedrum** and **Septemvri** the share of potentially purchased and controlled votes in the municipality has declined, although it remains relatively high - about one fifth of the municipality's vote (see **Figure 4**).

5 When applying the high outlier threshold

Figure 4 Dimensions of vote purchasing and manipulation by municipality, PE2021 November



In July 2021 **Sofia Municipality** and **Stara Zagora Municipality** were the leaders in terms of the share of potential purchased and controlled votes out of the total votes in at-risk polling stations in the country despite the low relative share of the number of polling stations at risk (see table in Appendix 1). The main factor for this was the higher population size of the municipalities. In the November 2021 PE, by this indicator the leading municipalities were the municipality of **Pazardzhik** (3.2% of the vote at risk), the municipality of **Samokov** (2.9% of the vote at risk) and the municipality of **Haskovo** (2.8% of the vote at risk).

Figure 5 Dimension of the potential purchased vote from the total vote in the municipality, PE2021 November



Votes at risk by political party

At the parliamentary elections in November 2021 **the Movement for Rights and Freedoms Party (MRF)** took the largest share of votes cast in at-risk polling stations[6]. They received **43.3%** of the vote in polling stations with deviations (see **Figure 6**). **GERB**, which in the last election in July 2021 were close to the percentage of MRF, fell to taking **18.2%** of the vote at risk. In the polling stations where the risk of purchased or controlled vote was identified as higher, at the November 2021 parliamentary elections 10.6% of citizens voted for **BSP** and **8.7%** for **"We Continue the Change". "There is Such a People" Party** (ITN) received **6.7%**, while **Democratic Bulgaria** coalition received **2.2%,** and **Renaissance party** received **2.3%** of the vote at risk.

In November 2021 **MRF** continues to lead in terms of the share of potential purchased and controlled votes of the total votes for a particular party with **14.9%** (see **Figure 7**). **The National Rally of the Right coalition** (between the Republicans for Bulgaria party and the Conservative Rightist Unity Party) come out ahead on this indicator, with 6.5% of their votes cast in at-risk polling stations. For the **Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)** this percentage is **3.5%**, and for **GERB** - **2.8%.**

In November 2021 PP **''We continue the change''** and **''Democratic Bulgaria''** coalition had the lowest share of their votes cast in risk sections (**1.2%** and **1.3%** respectively). Compared to the previous election cycles in 2021, all political parties registered an overall decline in the share of potentially purchased and controlled votes from the total number of votes for a particular party.

Figure 6 Distribution of the votes cast in polling stations at risk, by political party (high outlier threshold), PE2021 November



6. Using high threshold for determining extreme values

Figure 7 Percentage of votes for a political party cast at sections at risk, PE 2021 November



Part 3
Has a new controlled voting scheme emerged through mobile polling stations?

During the parliamentary elections in November 2021 at least 20,384 citizens voted in 521 mobile polling stations.[7] These mobile stations were concentrated in 214 settlements. In most of those the share of the vote cast in mobile polling stations was up to **5%** (116 settlements). In **41** localities the share of votes cast in mobile polling stations was between **10 and 25%** of the total number of votes cast, and in **15** it is above **25%.** Such settlements are: **Stambolovo** (54.3% of votes in mobile stations), **Chernoochene** (50.1% of votes in mobile stations), **Varbitsa** (42.4% of votes in mobile stations), **Kirkovo** (37.9% of votes in mobile stations), **Venets** (35.9% of votes) in mobile stations), **Hitrino** (34.6% of votes in mobile stations), **Brusartsi** (32.1% of votes in mobile stations), **Mineralni Bani** (29.8% of votes in mobile stations).

Some of these polling stations registered a high share of votes at risk in the July 2021 parliamentary elections – **Hitrino** (**39.5%** of the total number of votes cast) and **Kirkovo** (**27.5%** of the total number of votes cast). In **Hitrino** there was also a visible increase in the share of votes cast in mobile polling stations after the introduction of compulsory machine voting - from **11.7%** in April to **34.6%** in November. This trend was also observed in other settlements with a concentration of votes in mobile polling stations - **Satovcha** (from 3.7% to 26.2%), **Chernoochene** (from 24.0% to 50.1%), **Varbitsa** (from 13.7% to 42.4%), **Belitsa** (from 4.2% to 17.2%), **Kubrat** (from 2% to 18.5%), **Venets** (from 17.6% to 35.9%), **Dalgopol** (from 4.9% to 17.5%).

For most of the parliamentary parties, the votes cast for them in mobile polling stations are less than 1% of the total number of votes for them. Only in the case of **MRF** is **3%** of the votes for the party in the country, or **7 398** votes. In most of the settlements where there is a concentration of votes in mobile polling stations (**Chernoochene, Stambolovo, Varbitsa, Kirkovo, Mineralni Bani**), the MRF won decisively with over **90%** of the votes in the mobile polling stations. In **Brusartsi** a large part of the vote (on average 70%) in the mobile polling stations went for **GERB**.

The described concentration of votes in mobile polling stations in some settlements and the increase in this share after the introduction of compulsory machine voting may indicate a new form of vote control. Although nationally the number of votes cast in at-risk mobile polling stations is minimal and would be unlikely to have an impact on outcomes, this new form of vote control could have a significant impact in municipal elections. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that the procedure for opening mobile polling stations is led by the municipal administration. At the same time, since the opening of mobile polling stations is linked to the issuance of medical documents, the responsible institutions can easily verify the grounds for opening and voting in mobile polling stations. Such checks should be conducted in all localities where the concentration of voting in mobile polling stations is high.

7. According to the Central Election Commission (CEC) aggregated data, which notes whether a station is mobile. It is possible that the CEC summary data is not complete in this respect, as the addresses of some polling stations are noted as mobile, and for a number of polling stations address information is missing and the electoral list is up to 60 people. The Anti-Corruption Fund identified a further 169 polling stations with these characteristics that are not noted to be mobile in the CEC summary data. This paragraph analyses only the data of the mobile polling stations officially noted by the CEC as mobile.

Conclusion

Both the analysis of the electoral behavior in 1,738 historical at-risk polling stations and the identification of risk stations based on the latest election results show a tendency to reduce the size of the controlled and purchased vote in Bulgaria in the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria in November 2021. The reasons for this decrease can be sought in several directions:

- the changes in the electoral legislation by the 45th National Assembly, incl. the introduction of mass machine voting;
- the more proactive law enforcement actions to prevent vote buying;
- the increased interest of civil society and citizens in general in the voting stations where election violations and deviations in the election results were registered
- the reduction of the resource of political parties for buying and controlling the vote after several consecutive elections for the National Assembly within one calendar year.

Despite the positive trend of reduced risk vote, there are still districts and settlements that concentrate a large part of the votes at risk. The long-term solution to the problem of the phenomenon of controlled and bought votes goes through raising the political culture in the country by improving civic education; by reduction of regional disparities in the economic development of the country; and enhancing the parties' political culture of cultivating strong intra-party mechanisms to ensure the integrity of their members.

Appendix

Dimension of controlled and purchased vote by municipalities, PE2021 November

Municipality	Votes cast in polling stations at risk within the municipality (%, low outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk within the municipality (%, high outlier threshold)	Votes for the winner in polling stations at risk within the municipality (%, low outlier threshold)	Votes for the winner in polling stations at risk within the municipality (%, high outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk out of all votes at risk (%, low outlier threshold)	Votes cast in polling stations at risk out of all votes at risk (%, high outlier threshold)
AVREN	16.1%	16.1%	7.7%	7.7%	0.4%	0.5%
AYTOS	11.4%	11.4%	9.1%	9.1%	0.8%	1.1%
AKSAKOVO	16.6%	11.9%	7.7%	5.8%	0.9%	1.0%
ALFATAR	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ANTON	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ANTONOVO	19.5%	9.5%	10.1%	5.2%	0.4%	0.3%
APRILTSI	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ARDINO	8.3%	3.5%	7.2%	3.1%	0.4%	0.3%
ASENOVGRAD	7.5%	1.6%	4.8%	0.9%	1.2%	0.4%
BALCHIK	10.6%	6.4%	3.1%	2.3%	0.4%	0.4%
BANITE	7.2%	0.0%	2.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
BANSKO	9.7%	3.6%	3.5%	1.0%	0.4%	0.2%
BATAK	10.3%	10.3%	8.3%	8.3%	0.2%	0.3%
BELENE	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
BELITSA	11.8%	3.3%	10.2%	2.7%	0.4%	0.2%
BELOVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
BELOGRADCHIK	15.1%	12.4%	10.7%	10.1%	0.2%	0.3%
BELOSLAV	3.4%	0.0%	0.8%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
BERKOVITSA	11.7%	3.3%	3.3%	1.0%	0.5%	0.2%
BLAGOEVGRAD	0.8%	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%
BOBOV DOL	5.8%	3.9%	1.9%	1.1%	0.1%	0.1%
BOBOSHEVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
BOZHURISHTE	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
BOYNITSA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
BOYCHINOVTSI	33.7%	26.2%	14.2%	10.0%	0.7%	0.7%
BOLYAROVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
BORINO	2.8%	2.8%	1.9%	1.9%	0.0%	0.1%
BOROVAN	6.0%	0.0%	2.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
BOROVO	22.4%	14.7%	9.3%	6.5%	0.3%	0.2%
BOTEVGRAD	5.2%	3.3%	1.4%	0.9%	0.4%	0.4%
BRATYA DASKALOVI	8.2%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
BRATSIGOVO	2.8%	2.8%	1.3%	1.3%	0.1%	0.1%
BREGOVO	13.2%	0.0%	5.7%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
BREZNIK	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
BREZOVO	4.3%	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
BRUSARTSI	20.4%	20.4%	5.9%	5.9%	0.3%	0.4%

BURGAS	0.6%	0.6%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.5%
BYALA	10.9%	10.9%	4.9%	4.9%	0.4%	0.6%
BYALA SLATINA	25.9%	19.4%	12.3%	10.0%	1.7%	1.9%
VARNA	1.5%	0.9%	0.5%	0.4%	1.5%	1.3%
VELIKI PRESLAV	12.4%	12.4%	4.5%	4.5%	0.3%	0.5%
VELIKO TARNOVO	5.9%	2.4%	2.1%	1.2%	1.4%	0.8%
VELINGRAD	20.0%	7.0%	10.8%	4.6%	1.8%	0.9%
VENETS	10.9%	10.9%	6.3%	6.3%	0.3%	0.4%
VETOVO	11.5%	11.5%	7.3%	7.3%	0.3%	0.5%
VETRINO	22.0%	22.0%	13.9%	13.9%	0.3%	0.5%
VIDIN	4.1%	1.2%	1.2%	0.4%	0.5%	0.2%
VRATSA	4.9%	3.8%	1.8%	1.5%	0.9%	1.0%
VALCHEDRAM	36.4%	22.7%	28.9%	16.7%	0.8%	0.7%
VALCHI DOL	19.6%	19.6%	6.6%	6.6%	0.4%	0.6%
VARBITSA	16.3%	10.7%	13.0%	8.7%	0.5%	0.5%
VARSHETS	9.7%	9.7%	7.0%	7.0%	0.2%	0.3%
GABROVO	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%
GENERAL TOSHEVO	10.3%	7.7%	3.6%	2.6%	0.3%	0.3%
GEORGI DAMYANOVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
GLAVINITSA	10.3%	3.5%	7.6%	2.6%	0.4%	0.2%
GODECH	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
GORNA MALINA	14.8%	11.1%	4.6%	3.5%	0.2%	0.3%
GORNA ORYAHOVITSA	6.3%	4.1%	2.3%	1.8%	0.7%	0.7%
GOTSE DELCHEV	3.9%	1.4%	3.2%	1.0%	0.3%	0.2%
GRAMADA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
GULYANTSI	12.1%	8.9%	3.1%	2.2%	0.3%	0.3%
GURKOVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
GALABOVO	3.7%	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
GARMEN	22.6%	18.3%	14.4%	11.8%	1.1%	1.3%
DVE MOGILI	5.4%	5.4%	3.7%	3.7%	0.1%	0.1%
DEVIN	19.9%	14.2%	8.9%	4.8%	0.6%	0.6%
DEVNYA	15.3%	8.8%	11.3%	6.9%	0.3%	0.2%
DZHEBEL	8.9%	4.6%	7.2%	3.8%	0.4%	0.3%
DIMITROVGRAD	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
DIMOVO	19.0%	2.6%	6.0%	1.6%	0.3%	0.1%
DOBRICH - city	0.9%	0.8%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
DOBRICHKA	17.2%	15.0%	8.3%	7.1%	0.8%	1.0%
DOLNA BANYA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
DOLNA MITROPOLIYA	3.8%	3.8%	1.0%	1.0%	0.1%	0.2%
DOLNI DABNIK	9.6%	9.6%	5.0%	5.0%	0.2%	0.3%
DOLNI CHIFLIK	27.0%	18.5%	10.5%	7.5%	0.8%	0.8%
DOSPAT	7.8%	0.0%	3.4%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
DRAGOMAN	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
DRYANOVO	1.4%	1.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%
DULOVO	19.1%	17.2%	13.1%	11.7%	1.5%	2.0%
DUPNITSA	1.8%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
DALGOPOL	18.2%	10.3%	8.5%	4.7%	0.6%	0.5%

ELENA	30.1%	23.3%	11.8%	8.7%	0.7%	0.8%
ELIN PELIN	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ELHOVO	3.0%	1.5%	1.4%	0.7%	0.1%	0.1%
ETROPOLE	3.8%	2.1%	0.9%	0.5%	0.1%	0.1%
ZAVET	5.5%	0.0%	1.8%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
ZEMEN	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ZLATARITSA	19.3%	19.3%	5.2%	5.2%	0.2%	0.3%
ZLATITSA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ZLATOGRAD	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
IVAYLOVGRAD	6.8%	6.8%	5.6%	5.6%	0.1%	0.2%
IVANOVO	1.7%	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ISKAR	28.2%	8.4%	6.6%	2.3%	0.3%	0.1%
ISPERIH	7.6%	4.8%	3.9%	2.6%	0.5%	0.5%
IHTIMAN	11.8%	0.0%	5.2%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%
KAVARNA	3.6%	2.5%	1.5%	1.0%	0.1%	0.1%
KAZANLAK	3.2%	3.2%	1.2%	1.2%	0.6%	0.8%
KAYNARDZHA	37.7%	34.3%	18.7%	17.5%	0.4%	0.5%
KALOYANOVO	7.0%	4.1%	1.9%	1.1%	0.2%	0.2%
KAMENO	17.9%	11.7%	6.4%	4.5%	0.4%	0.4%
KAOLINOVO	3.5%	3.5%	3.0%	3.0%	0.1%	0.2%
KARLOVO	1.3%	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
KARNOBAT	7.4%	5.4%	2.7%	1.8%	0.4%	0.4%
KASPICHAN	24.0%	24.0%	3.9%	3.9%	0.4%	0.6%
KIRKOVO	14.6%	11.9%	11.5%	9.1%	1.0%	1.2%
KNEZHA	32.6%	32.6%	10.4%	10.4%	1.0%	1.5%
KOVATCHEVTSI	14.3%	0.0%	5.7%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
KOZLODUY	5.3%	5.3%	1.1%	1.1%	0.2%	0.4%
KOPRIVSHTITSA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
KOSTENETS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
KOSTINBROD	4.0%	2.9%	1.5%	1.0%	0.2%	0.2%
KOTEL	24.9%	15.6%	13.1%	7.3%	0.9%	0.8%
KOCHERINOVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
KRESNA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
KRIVODOL	17.6%	13.5%	5.9%	4.3%	0.3%	0.4%
KRICHIM	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
KRUMOVGRAD	5.9%	2.5%	4.0%	2.2%	0.4%	0.3%
KRUSHARI	13.1%	5.4%	10.0%	4.0%	0.1%	0.1%
KUBRAT	14.0%	7.2%	9.2%	5.2%	0.6%	0.5%
KUKLEN	9.1%	2.4%	3.7%	1.3%	0.1%	0.1%
KULA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
KARDZHALI	10.0%	7.2%	6.2%	5.1%	1.9%	2.0%
KYUSTENDIL	1.5%	0.7%	0.4%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
LEVSKI	29.8%	25.9%	11.4%	9.9%	1.2%	1.5%
LESICHOVO	20.7%	20.7%	10.7%	10.7%	0.3%	0.4%
LETNITSA	8.1%	8.1%	2.7%	2.7%	0.1%	0.1%
LOVECH	7.1%	1.7%	2.1%	0.4%	0.9%	0.3%
LOZNITSA	10.6%	8.8%	7.0%	5.9%	0.3%	0.4%

LOM	19.3%	13.2%	6.6%	4.8%	1.0%	1.0%
LUKOVIT	15.4%	15.4%	6.0%	6.0%	0.5%	0.8%
LAKI	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
LYUBIMETS	1.3%	1.3%	0.6%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%
LYASKOVETS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MADAN	8.4%	4.0%	5.4%	2.4%	0.4%	0.2%
MADZHAROVO	12.1%	1.8%	10.9%	1.2%	0.1%	0.0%
MAKRESH	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MALKO TARNOVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MARITSA	6.0%	3.7%	2.7%	2.0%	0.4%	0.3%
MEDKOVETS	28.7%	28.7%	9.5%	9.5%	0.3%	0.4%
MEZDRA	4.7%	2.6%	0.9%	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%
MIZIYA	8.4%	8.4%	3.4%	3.4%	0.1%	0.2%
MINERALNI BANI	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MIRKOVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MOMCHILGARD	13.3%	9.4%	10.0%	8.0%	0.8%	0.8%
MONTANA	9.5%	8.8%	4.8%	4.6%	1.3%	1.8%
MAGLIZH	11.5%	11.5%	4.3%	4.3%	0.2%	0.3%
NEVESTINO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
NEDELINO	5.6%	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
NESEBAR	1.4%	1.4%	0.5%	0.5%	0.1%	0.1%
NIKOLA KOZLEVO	3.0%	3.0%	1.4%	1.4%	0.1%	0.1%
NIKOLAEVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
NIKOPOL	6.8%	6.8%	2.4%	2.4%	0.2%	0.2%
NOVA ZAGORA	5.4%	3.4%	2.7%	2.1%	0.4%	0.4%
NOVI PAZAR	3.7%	3.7%	2.3%	2.3%	0.1%	0.2%
NOVO SELO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
OMURTAG	11.3%	10.5%	8.9%	8.4%	0.7%	0.9%
OPAKA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
OPAN	3.0%	3.0%	1.0%	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ORYAHOVO	11.6%	11.6%	3.7%	3.7%	0.3%	0.4%
PAVEL BANYA	20.4%	20.4%	10.1%	10.1%	0.6%	0.9%
PAVLIKENI	19.7%	17.7%	9.2%	8.5%	1.0%	1.3%
PAZARDZHIK	10.8%	9.3%	3.6%	3.1%	2.6%	3.2%
PANAGYURISHTE	5.0%	5.0%	1.1%	1.1%	0.3%	0.4%
PERNIK	0.2%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
PERUSHTITSA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
PETRICH	7.4%	4.1%	3.3%	1.8%	0.9%	0.7%
PESHTERA	17.4%	6.8%	6.1%	3.3%	0.7%	0.4%
PIRDOP	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
PLEVEN	6.2%	5.4%	2.2%	1.9%	2.1%	2.7%
PLOVDIV	0.9%	0.8%	0.5%	0.4%	0.8%	1.0%
POLSKI TRAMBESH	28.4%	28.4%	14.3%	14.3%	0.9%	1.2%
POMORIE	10.0%	5.9%	7.4%	4.1%	0.6%	0.5%
POPOVO	18.1%	14.3%	7.8%	6.3%	0.9%	1.1%
PORDIM	13.0%	13.0%	3.7%	3.7%	0.2%	0.2%
PRAVETS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

PRIMORSKO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
PROVADIYA	12.7%	10.4%	5.3%	3.9%	0.6%	0.7%
PARVOMAY	13.3%	6.2%	4.6%	2.1%	0.7%	0.5%
RADNEVO	4.8%	1.3%	1.5%	0.6%	0.2%	0.1%
RADOMIR	1.6%	1.6%	1.0%	1.0%	0.1%	0.1%
RAZGRAD	9.4%	6.1%	5.6%	3.5%	1.1%	1.0%
RAZLOG	4.9%	4.9%	1.9%	1.9%	0.3%	0.4%
RAKITOVO	49.1%	41.5%	27.4%	23.9%	1.4%	1.7%
RAKOVSKI	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
RILA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
RODOPI	5.5%	2.3%	1.7%	0.9%	0.4%	0.3%
ROMAN	3.2%	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
RUDOZEM	13.1%	8.4%	8.6%	5.2%	0.4%	0.4%
RUEN	7.1%	4.4%	6.0%	4.0%	0.7%	0.6%
RUZHINTSI	8.1%	8.1%	2.9%	2.9%	0.1%	0.1%
RUSE	1.1%	0.7%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%
SADOVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SAMOKOV	19.8%	19.8%	10.4%	10.4%	2.0%	2.9%
SAMUIL	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SANDANSKI	0.7%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%
SAPAREVA BANYA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SATOVCHA	28.1%	14.7%	16.9%	8.6%	1.3%	1.0%
SVILENGRAD	0.7%	0.7%	0.2%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%
SVISHTOV	6.8%	3.7%	2.4%	1.6%	0.5%	0.4%
SVOGE	9.5%	7.8%	3.0%	2.5%	0.5%	0.6%
SEVLEVO	5.8%	4.1%	2.4%	1.7%	0.5%	0.5%
SEPTEMVRI	19.6%	19.6%	14.5%	14.5%	1.0%	1.4%
SILISTRA	1.9%	0.7%	0.9%	0.6%	0.3%	0.1%
SIMEONOVGRAD	10.1%	0.0%	5.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
SIMITLI	1.4%	1.4%	1.0%	1.0%	0.1%	0.1%
SITOVO	19.4%	0.0%	16.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%
SLIVEN	5.6%	2.8%	2.5%	1.4%	1.5%	1.1%
SLIVNITSA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SLIVO POLE	19.1%	13.3%	8.1%	6.5%	0.4%	0.4%
SMOLYAN	1.7%	1.3%	0.9%	0.7%	0.2%	0.2%
SMYADOVO	11.6%	4.7%	5.7%	1.7%	0.1%	0.1%
SOZOPOL	2.0%	2.0%	1.1%	1.1%	0.1%	0.1%
SOPOT	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SREDETS	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
STAMBOLIYSKI	1.5%	1.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.1%	0.1%
STAMBOLOVO	6.6%	0.0%	4.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
STARA ZAGORA	2.8%	2.6%	0.9%	0.8%	1.2%	1.6%
Sofia (capital) 23rd ED	0.8%	0.5%	0.2%	0.1%	1.3%	1.2%
Sofia (capital) 24th ED	1.0%	0.8%	0.2%	0.2%	1.1%	1.4%
Sofia (capital) 25th ED	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%
STRAZHITSA	33.3%	33.3%	14.0%	14.0%	1.0%	1.4%
STRALDZHA	5.9%	3.3%	1.6%	0.6%	0.1%	0.1%

STRELCHA	21.8%	0.0%	10.3%	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%
STRUMYANI	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SUVOROVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SUNGULARE	24.3%	17.6%	19.4%	13.5%	0.7%	0.7%
SUHINDOL	12.8%	8.3%	3.7%	2.5%	0.1%	0.1%
SAEDINENIE	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SARNITSA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
TVARDITSA	8.1%	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
TERVEL	23.3%	17.8%	14.6%	12.2%	0.8%	0.9%
TETEVEN	29.2%	24.4%	15.5%	13.5%	1.4%	1.7%
TOPOLOVGRAD	4.3%	0.0%	2.3%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
TREKLYANO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
TROYAN	2.8%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
TRAN	1.8%	1.8%	0.5%	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%
TRYAVNA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
TUNDZHA	2.3%	1.2%	0.6%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%
TUTRAKAN	7.7%	7.7%	6.0%	6.0%	0.3%	0.5%
TARGOVISHTE	13.9%	9.3%	7.0%	5.4%	2.0%	1.9%
UGARCHIN	5.5%	5.5%	1.8%	1.8%	0.1%	0.1%
HADZHIDIMOVO	16.8%	8.1%	9.6%	4.4%	0.4%	0.3%
HAYREDIN	39.0%	13.2%	15.5%	4.9%	0.5%	0.2%
HARMANLI	11.5%	5.2%	3.6%	1.7%	0.6%	0.4%
HASKOVO	9.2%	7.7%	4.2%	3.5%	2.3%	2.8%
HISARYA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
HITRINO	13.8%	10.3%	6.6%	4.8%	0.2%	0.3%
TSAR KALOYAN	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
TSAREVO	7.6%	2.5%	3.1%	0.8%	0.2%	0.1%
TSENOVO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
CHAVDAR	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
CHELOPECH	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
CHEPELARE	7.5%	4.7%	3.9%	2.8%	0.1%	0.1%
CHERVEN BRYAG	22.8%	13.4%	8.6%	6.1%	1.4%	1.2%
CHERNOOCHENE	25.4%	13.3%	20.8%	10.6%	0.9%	0.7%
CHIPROVTSI	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
CHIRPAN	11.5%	10.4%	7.6%	7.2%	0.5%	0.6%
CHUPRENE	19.8%	0.0%	6.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
SHABLA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SHUMEN	1.6%	1.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%
YABLANITSA	10.2%	10.2%	3.5%	3.5%	0.1%	0.2%
YAKIMOVO	8.0%	8.0%	3.7%	3.7%	0.1%	0.1%
YAKORUDA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
YAMBOL	0.8%	0.8%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%

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